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Trust: A Model for Disclosure in Patent Law*
ARI EZRA WALDMAN†
How to draw the line between public and private is a foundational, first-principles
question of privacy law, but the answer has implications for intellectual property, as
well. This project is one in a series of papers about first-person disclosures of information in the privacy and intellectual property law contexts, and it defines the boundary between public and nonpublic information through the lens of social science
—namely, principles of trust.
Patent law’s public use bar confronts the question of whether legal protection
should extend to information previously disclosed to a small group of people. I present evidence that shows that current application of the public use bar privileges the
confidentiality and control norms of industry while minimizing those no less strong
norms common to lone entrepreneurs. This results in a general pattern: corporate
inventors tend to win their public use cases; solo entrepreneurs tend to lose them. As
a result, the public use bar has unintended negative effects, including discouraging
experimentation and discriminating against inventors without the financial backing
of corporate employers. These results are the direct effects of how courts determine
the difference between public and nonpublic uses.
This project proposes a new way of talking about, thinking through, and determining when previous disclosures bar subsequent patentability. In short, I argue that
invention disclosures in contexts of trust retain their legal protection despite any
ostensible loss of control or lack of formal confidentiality agreements. This proposal
respects social network differences and will advance the goals of patent law and
increase access to the innovation economy for all persons.
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INTRODUCTION
A variety of claims depend on whether information previously disclosed to another is still legally protectable as private. For example, a victim of nonconsensual
pornography, commonly known as “revenge porn,” may sue for public disclosure of
private facts.1 But the success of her claim hinges on whether she retains a privacy
interest in a picture that she may have voluntarily texted to another. 2 A Fourth
Amendment challenge to the admission of a defendant’s cell site data at trial may
fail because previous disclosure of that data to the phone company extinguishes the
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy.3 And, in certain cases, retention of
attorney-client privilege after a disclosure to a third party depends on whether the
third party was truly an unrelated member of the public or a close ally in litigation. 4
The boundary between public and private is a foundational question of privacy

1. See Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 357–59 (2014) (noting the possibility of nonconsensual pornography victims using the tort of public disclosure of private facts, but also highlighting the barriers
to success for victims using tort law); see also Ari Ezra Waldman, A Breach of Trust: Fighting
“Revenge Porn,” 102 IOWA L. REV. 709, 713 (2017) (proposing the use of the tort of breach
of confidentiality in some revenge porn cases).
2. See Mary Anne Franks, Combatting Non-Consensual Pornography: A Working Paper
(Sept. 7, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2336537 [https://perma.cc/P5V7-MDHS].
3. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 507–09, 511–12 (11th Cir. 2015); In
re Application of United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 602–03 (5th Cir.
2013). But see United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(concurring in the result holding that GPS tracking on public streets was a Fourth Amendment
search and arguing that it is “necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties”).
4. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921–22 (2d Cir. 1961) (recognizing that
disclosure to a nonlawyer could still permit protection of the privilege in limited
circumstances).
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law.5 But the question of when information remains legally protectable despite previous disclosure is not the exclusive realm of those writing about privacy; intellectual
property lawyers have an interest in this fight, as well.
Section 102 of the Patent Act, as amended recently by the America Invents Act
(AIA), states that an invention “in public use” or “disclosed” or “otherwise available
to the public” for more than one year prior to filing an application for the patent will
not be considered novel and, thus, not eligible for a patent. 6 What is a public use
under the Patent Act, then, depends on drawing the line between public and private.
And where we draw the line matters: In 2008, the last year of AstraZeneca’s patent
on Prilosec, for example, the company reported more than $800 million in sales 7 after
beating back claims that its patent was invalid for prepatenting public use. 8 Public
use bar cases have also determined ownership over multimillion dollar products like
the Rubik’s Cube, which has sold more than 350 million units since 1980. 9 In addition to helping determine the fate of millions of dollars in revenue, the public use
bar’s application defines the boundaries of experimentation, which could mean the
difference between functioning and nonfunctioning widgets, drugs, and machines.
This Article bridges a gap between privacy and intellectual property scholarship
and proposes a conceptual and practical framework for determining when a previously disclosed invention is still patentable. In short, it depends on social network
norms and relationships of trust: when the relationship between the parties is characterized by trust and expectations of confidentiality, information disclosed should remain protected.
Currently, public use case law links publicness with the inventor’s loss of control
over her invention prior to patenting. 10 In this way, one of the dominant conventional
theories of privacy11—privacy as the right to control what others know about you—is

5. Although the full breadth of the privacy literature in this area is too extensive to list
here, several works collect and analyze the scholarship well. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen,
Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373
(2000); Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1099–126 (2002);
Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy as Trust: Sharing Personal Information in a Networked World,
69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 559, 565–88 (2015).
6. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2012). Fortunately, the current § 102(a) closely tracks the
language of the pre-AIA § 102(b). Mark A. Lemley, Does “Public Use” Mean the Same Thing
It Did Last Year?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1119, 1123–35 (2015). Many patent scholars have also
proposed new approaches to the public use bar. See, e.g., Katherine E. White, A General Rule
of Law Is Needed To Define Public Use in Patent Cases, 88 KY. L.J. 423 (2000).
7. Jack Neff, P&G’s Hold on Prilosec OTC Extended to 2008, ADVERT. AGE (July 26,
2006), http://adage.com/article/news/p-g-s-hold-prilosec-otc-extended-2008/110431/ [https://
perma.cc/2B4K-WENL].
8. In re Omeprazole Patent Litig., 536 F.3d 1361, 1371–75 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
9. Luke Villapaz, Rubik’s Cube 40th Anniversary: 9 Facts Behind the Famous 3-D Toy
Puzzle, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2014, 4:28 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/rubiks-cube-40th
-anniversary-9-facts-behind-famous-3-d-toy-puzzle-1576562 [https://perma.cc/KE78-2UEG].
10. See infra text accompanying notes 22–36.
11. Privacy-as-control is a dominant theory in privacy scholarship. See, e.g., JULIE C.
INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 56–57 (1992); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM 7 (1967); Jean L. Cohen, The Necessity of Privacy, 68 SOC. RES. 318, 319 (2001);
Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 484 (1968). Elsewhere, I have argued that although
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reflected in patent law’s novelty jurisprudence. This theory is an affirmative right
located within the individual that embraces principles of autonomy and choice. It
separates the private and public worlds with retention and loss of control over information, respectively.
As a means of determining the extent of personal privacy rights, a doctrine based
on control and secrecy is problematic. Its bright-line rule extinguishes our privacy
interests when any third party knows something about us, an increasingly common
phenomenon in a networked world.12 And it allows others to encroach on spheres we
would normally consider private.13 Similarly, as a means of determining the difference between public and nonpublic uses and disclosures under the Patent Act, the
notion of control discourages experimentation and innovation and frustrates the goals
of patent law generally. As implemented, the standard is also discriminatory. It privileges wealthy and corporate inventors over other innovators by relying too heavily
on executed confidentiality agreements and the confidentiality norms of corporate
actors. As a result, by disrespecting how many entrepreneurs commonly interact with
others, the public use bar entrenches wealthy interests and excludes other entrepreneurs from the innovation economy.
Relying on research into social networks and interpersonal trust, this Article proposes a new way of talking about, thinking through, and determining when previous
disclosures bar subsequent patentability. I argue that disclosures in networks characterized by trust retain their privacy interests despite any ostensible loss of control or
lack of formal confidentiality agreements. I have called this proposal “privacy-astrust,” and I apply it from the privacy context to the public use bar. Trust, defined as
a resource of social capital between or among two or more persons concerning the
expectations that other members of their community will behave according to accepted norms,14 is the defining feature of social interaction. 15 It is, I have argued, the
catalyst for an individual’s decision to disclose otherwise private information. 16 Because we share when we trust and because trust is a contextual social phenomenon,
it makes intuitive sense to distinguish between public and private uses or disclosures
along these lines using a totality of the circumstances test.

conceptualizations of privacy vary wildly, the conventional wisdom is really two sides of the
same coin. For some, the private world represents freedom from society; for others, privacy
gives us the individual freedom for autonomous lives of free choice. All are based on the same
respect for the individual as the locus of the privacy right, and all are burdened by limitations:
some are overinclusive, while others are underinclusive; some are too elastic, while others are
egregiously rigid. See Waldman, supra note 5, at 565–88.
12. Solove has called this the “secrecy paradigm.” DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL
PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 42–47, 143–49 (2004).
13. Id. at 42–43, 143.
14. Alejandro Portes & Julia Sensenbrenner, Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on
the Social Determinants of Economic Action, 98 AM. J. SOC. 1320, 1332 (1993).
15. See J. David Lewis & Andrew Weigert, Trust as a Social Reality, 63 SOC. FORCES
967, 969 (1985).
16. See Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Sharing, and Trust: The Facebook Study, 67 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2726929
[https://perma.cc/M2PU-RR7E] (presenting quantitative data showing that trust is a key,
statistically significant factor in individuals’ decision to share personal information on
Facebook).
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Applying privacy-as-trust to the public use context has several advantages: it is
egalitarian, flexible, practical, and faithful to the policy objectives of patent law. By
respecting the confidentiality norms of different social groups, privacy-as-trust
would help rebalance public use jurisprudence among all types of inventors. It is also
flexible enough to accommodate myriad different social contexts, many of which are
characterized by such strong notions of confidentiality that formal agreements are
unnecessary. The standard is also administrable on a case-by-case basis, offering
clear opportunities for the admission of evidence of expectations of social network
confidentiality alongside myriad other cues of nonpublic disclosure. And it will advance the policy goals of patent law by protecting inventors’ rights, encouraging experimentation, and freeing up public information for future use.
What’s more, this proposal is not as radical as it seems. Social network theory and
trust are already at play throughout intellectual property law. We see respect for social networks in patent law’s enablement requirement, which is defined relative to
someone of “ordinary skill in the art”17 of the invention. Copyright law’s originality
requirement is genre specific, recognizing that originality and creativity mean different things for different cultural artifacts. And trademark law accepts that two companies can use similar marks as long their products, marketing channels, and consumer markets remain in separate networks. Trade secret law goes even further.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I surveys and analyzes public use case
law and makes two related arguments. First, that control over information has so far
been the dominant standard for determining when prepatenting disclosures implicate
the public use bar. Second, as implemented, the standard discriminates against
noncorporate entrepreneurs by privileging the confidentiality norms of corporate actors over the distinct norms and practices of other social networks. This section also
criticizes the logical failure of a disclosure standard that ignores the relationships
between the parties involved. To resolve that central failure, Part II proposes a new
standard. Using social networks theory and social science evidence on information
flow and trust, this Article argues that privacy-as-trust is a fair and administrable way
to draw the line between public and nonpublic first-person disclosures in patent law.
The doctrine holds that information disclosed in a context of trust, based on networkspecific norms of confidentiality, custom, and the entirety of the social context of
disclosure, is not public and, thus, is still protectable as private. This Part concludes
by showing the advantages of this proposal. Part III returns to several of the public
use cases discussed in Part I and applies privacy-as-trust to these real contexts. Sometimes, though not always, results would change under the new standard; in all cases,
privacy-as-trust is fair, egalitarian, and loyal to the goals of patent law. I respond to
several anticipated objections and conclude with recommendations for future
research.
I. PATENT LAW’S DENIAL OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS
To get a patent, your invention must be novel. To be novel, it cannot have been
in public use, disclosed, or otherwise available to the public more than one year prior

17. 35 U.S.C. §§ 103, 112 (2012).
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to patenting.18 The purposes of the public use bar are noble ones: to incentivize
prompt disclosure, to discourage inventors from commercializing their products
while keeping prior art out of the public domain, to give inventors a reasonable
amount of time to determine the market for their products, and to protect the public
domain.19 If, as several leading patent scholars have argued,20 the recent America
Invents Act amendments do not change the meaning of the novelty requirement,
patent law’s publicity triggers will continue to be based either on a secrecy paradigm21 or, in the case of the public use bar, on the extent to which an inventor retains
control over her invention during prepatenting use.
In practice, however, the public use rule—that loss of control means public use
—generally overemphasizes the importance of formal confidentiality agreements
and commonly ignores the confidentiality norms of noncorporate and noncontractual
social relationships. As such, the public use bar privileges corporate, wealthy, and
established inventors for whom contracts and nondisclosure agreements come easily.
And it makes it difficult for other types of entrepreneurs to test and market their
inventions.
In this section, I summarize the law of public use, show how similar it is to one
of the dominant theories of privacy, and then show its uneven application using a
series of illustrative public use cases. I conclude with a short discussion of how current application of the public use bar tends to institutionalize corporate privilege and
limits entrepreneurs’ access to the innovation economy.
A. The Public Use Bar and Privacy-as-Control
Federal Circuit case law states that lack of control is the shibboleth of public use:

18. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2012).
19. Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Kimberly-Clark
Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also, e.g., Nancy S.
Paik, Implied Professional Obligation of Confidentiality Sufficient To Overcome Public Use
Defense to a Claim of Patent Infringement? Bernhardt v. Collezione - The Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals’ Surprising Recent Announcement on the Public Use Bar, 4 CHI.-KENT J.
INTELL. PROP. 332, 333–34 (2005).
20. See Lemley, supra note 6; Robert P. Merges, Priority and Novelty Under the AIA, 27
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1023 (2012).
21. See SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 42–47 (introducing, describing, and ultimately critiquing the “secrecy paradigm” in privacy jurisprudence). The “secrecy paradigm” is evident in
the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of § 102(a) of the Patent Act of 1952 in that anything not
secret is public. As the court stated recently in In re Enhanced Security Research, LLC, § 102
has always been interpreted “broadly.” 739 F.3d 1347, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2014). “[E]ven relatively obscure documents,” like a single copy of a graduate thesis buried in a German university library, “qualify as prior art so long as the public has a means of accessing them.” Id.
(citing In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899, 900 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). The Federal Circuit made a similar
conclusion in W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., where it found that the process for
rapidly stretching Teflon without it breaking was publicly used even though it was only used
inside Gore’s shop. 721 F.2d 1540, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1983). And, of course, the famous and
oft-cited Egbert v. Lipmann, which held that a woman was publicly using a corset invented by
her fiancé even though she was wearing the only prototype under her clothes, is a paradigmatic
example of the secrecy paradigm, as well. 104 U.S. 333, 335 (1881).

2017] TRUS T: A MO DEL FO R DIS CL OS UR E I N P ATE N T L A W

563

a public use occurs when an inventor allows others to use her invention without retaining control over the device.22 In a nod to the connection between public use and
privacy, the court has noted that control depends on whether the inventor retained a
“legitimate expectation of privacy and of confidentiality.” 23 Like privacy questions,
then, public use claims require judges to determine when an expectation of privacy
exists. And like an individual’s expectations of privacy, whether an inventor retained
control over her invention is supposed to be based on a variety of nondeterminative
factors. In the public use context, those factors include: what the inventor did to share
her invention, the public’s access to and knowledge of the invention, whether the
inventor imposed confidentiality obligations on those present, 24 and evidence of experimentation.25 The one factor ostensibly focused on the relationship between the
inventor and the public—the presence of confidentiality or secrecy obligations—is
supposed to be flexible: a formal nondisclosure agreement is not required. 26 As we
shall see, that flexibility is unevenly applied.
Experimental use, which is supposed to negate a finding of public use, is also
determined via a variety of factors, including the number of prototypes being tested,
the duration of those tests, the existence of records and secrecy agreements, compensation, and retention of control by the inventor. 27 That the multifactor tests overlap
is telling. Public use is most appropriately determined in context on a case-by-case
basis because each disclosure occurs in a unique set of circumstances. 28
But at the core of public use law is the control the inventor retains over her invention. And an inventor’s choice to give up control is the salient factor in nudging a
court toward a finding of public use. The Supreme Court made this clear in 1877. In
Elizabeth v. Pavement Co.,29 the Court stated that as long as an inventor “does not
voluntarily allow others to make [the invention] and use it, and so long as it is not on
sale for general use, he keeps the invention under his own control, and does not lose
his title to a patent.”30 This cause-and-effect relationship between voluntary disclosure and erosion of control is the hallmark of modern public use law, as well.
In Lough v. Brunswick Corp.,31 for example, the Federal Circuit invalidated a
patent for boat motor seals because the inventor gave away his invention, installed it
on another’s boat, and failed to keep track of the test boat’s operation with the

22. Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding nonpublic use because the inventor had at all times “retained control” over the device
during prepatenting demonstrations).
23. Id. at 1265.
24. Bernhardt, L.L.C. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 386 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
25. Atlanta Attachment Co. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 516 F.3d 1361, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (Prost, J., concurring).
26. Moleculon Research Corp., 793 F.2d at 1266.
27. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing TP Labs. v.
Prof’l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 971–72 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
28. See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT (2010) (information flows are subject
to contextual norms that vary from context to context); Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as
Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119 (2004) (same).
29. 97 U.S. 126 (1877).
30. Id. at 135.
31. 86 F.3d 1113.
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installed prototype.32 In Beachcombers International, Inc. v. WildeWood Creative
Products,33 a designer lost her patent for a new kaleidoscope because she chose to
demonstrate the invention for party guests and allowed them to handle and use it. 34
And in Baxter International, Inc. v. Cobe Laboratories,35 an inventor lost control of
his invention (and thus lost his patent) not only because he demonstrated his new
centrifuge for others, but also because he allowed a free flow of bodies through his
lab that housed the device.36 In these and many other cases, the Federal Circuit took
away patents because inventors had voluntarily given over their inventions to others
and, in so doing, made the decision to give up control over their devices.
In this way, patent law’s public use bar reflects one of the dominant conceptualizations of privacy: privacy as choice and control. This is the theory that a right to
privacy means having the right to control one’s personal information and the freedom
to decide to share it with some and not others. The paradigm is pervasive, evident in
leading works of privacy scholarship and a multitude of privacy cases. And the language scholars and judges use to describe privacy is reminiscent of the Federal
Circuit’s discussion of public use and control.
Privacy-as-control scholars could just as easily be speaking about individuals concerned about their privacy as inventors disclosing their devices. For instance, Jean
Cohen has argued that privacy is the right “to choose whether, when, and with
whom” to share intimate information. 37 Alan Westin suggests that privacy “is the
claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how,
and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.” 38 It is, to
Julie Inness, the idea that an individual has “control over a realm of intimacy” 39 and,
to Jonathan Zittrain, control over our information in general. 40 For the philosopher
Steve Matthews, exercising privacy is making the choice to “control” and “manage”
the boundary between ourselves and others. 41 The common denominator in all these
descriptions is free choice and control, and it is the same dynamic at play in cases
like Elizabeth, Lough, Beachcombers, and Baxter, just with different information.
Privacy-as-control is also evident in the current interpretation of the tort of public
disclosure of private facts.42 Here, too, the comparison to public use analysis is striking. Although the tort’s often uneven application has spawned much debate and
scholarship,43 an individual tends to lose control and, thus, a privacy interest, in

32. Id. at 1121.
33. 31 F.3d 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
34. Id. at 1159–60.
35. 88 F.3d 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
36. Id. at 1058–59.
37. Cohen, supra note 11, at 319.
38. WESTIN, supra note 11, at 7.
39. INNESS, supra note 11, at 56.
40. Jonathan Zittrain, What the Publisher Can Teach the Patient: Intellectual Property
and Privacy in an Era of Trusted Privication, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1203 (2000) (“In my
view, there is a profound relationship between those who wish to protect intellectual property
and those who wish to protect privacy.”).
41. Steve Matthews, Anonymity and the Social Self, 47 AM. PHIL. Q. 351, 351 (2010).
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
43. See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L.
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information once she has voluntarily divulged it to another or once the information
is already publicly available.44 Like Oliver Sipple, who could not prevent the media
from disclosing his sexual orientation after he had already disclosed it to friends in
San Francisco,45 and like Ralph Nader, who could not prevent General Motors from
gathering personal information already known to others as part of the company’s plot
to discredit him,46 the inventors in Lough, Beachcombers, and Baxter could not put
the cat back in the bag. Their inventions, either from voluntary disclosures (Lough
and Beachcombers)47 or public availability (Baxter),48 were already out of their control and known and used by others.
B. The Uneven Application of the Public Use Bar
It seems evident, then, that the law of public use reflects the dynamics of privacyas-control. That itself is problematic because it creates the potential for what Daniel
Solove has called a “secrecy paradigm” to govern what should be a more flexible,
case-by-case standard. In privacy law, the secrecy paradigm refers to the erroneous
conflation of privacy and secrecy: it creates a bright-line rule that something is private if it is secret, but if it is known to even one other person, it is no longer secret
and, thus, not protectable as private. 49 It is at play all over the privacy spectrum, from
tort law50 to the Fourth Amendment.51

REV. 919 (2005); Waldman, supra note 5.
44. See, e.g., Sipple v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 669 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(finding that disclosure of Sipple’s sexual orientation to a group of people extinguished his
privacy interests in the information upon subsequent disclosure to the broader public); Nader
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 770 (N.Y. 1970) (“Information about the plaintiff
which was already known to others could hardly be regarded as private . . . .”); Killilea v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 499 N.E.2d 1291, 1295 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (“There is no liability
when the defendant merely gives further publicity to information about the plaintiff that . . .
the plaintiff leaves open to the public . . . .”). But see, e.g., Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis,
795 S.W.2d 488, 501–02 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that voluntarily attending a social
gathering at a hospital with media in attendance did not vitiate privacy interest in family’s
decision to use in vitro fertilization).
45. Sipple, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 668–69.
46. Nader, 255 N.E.2d at 770 (including information gleaned from interviews with friends
and acquaintances).
47. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding public use
when inventor “provided the seal assemblies to friends . . . .”); Beachcombers Int’l, Inc. v.
WildeWood Creative Prods., 31 F.3d 1154, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding public use when
inventor voluntarily gave her kaleidoscope to party guests).
48. Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Cobe Labs., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1056, 1058–59 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(finding that the inventor showed others how the centrifuge worked and permitted free flow
through his lab, allowing all who passed to see the device).
49. SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 42–47, 143–49.
50. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 735, 742 (1979) (finding that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in numbers captured by pen register); United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440–43 (1976) (finding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
in bank records). The Third Party Doctrine, spawned by Miller, Smith, and their progeny, re-
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It helps explain several public use cases, as well. In Lough, the inventor showed
his device to five friends, who used it on their boats. 52 And in the classic case of
Egbert v. Lippmann,53 the Supreme Court stated that an “intimate friend” wearing a
corset under her clothes constituted public use: “If an inventor . . . gives or sells it to
another, to be used by the donee or vendee, without limitation or restriction, or injunction of secrecy, and it is so used, such use is public, even though the use . . . may
be confined to one person.”54 The secrecy paradigm may have the benefit of clarity,
but it imposes a harsh bright-line rule where case-by-case precision may be more
appropriate.
The secrecy paradigm alone, however, fails to explain the majority of public use
cases. As applied, public use law is less an indiscriminate blunt axe than a discriminatory scalpel. Sometimes, the Federal Circuit applies its rule that confidentiality
agreements are just one factor to consider; elsewhere, nondisclosure agreements are
treated as essential. And sometimes, norms of confidentiality are respected; at other
times, they are ignored. The result sounds like a confusing muddle, but one distinct
pattern emerges: corporate inventors tend to win their public use cases; solo entrepreneurs tend to lose.55

flects the secrecy paradigm. The doctrine states that individuals cannot have a legitimate expectation of privacy in information in the hands of third parties. It is the subject of great criticism in the legal academy. See Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and
Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 752–53
(2005). But see generally Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 561 (2009).
52. Lough, 86 F.3d at 1121.
53. 104 U.S. 333 (1881).
54. Id. at 335–36.
55. This Article uses the hierarchical clustering technique to distinguish between two
clusters of inventors: (A) those that are supported by large corporate structures, and (B) those
that invent in their spare time or without corporate resources. Cluster analysis is a method for
grouping objects together in groups (clusters) based on their similarities across a series of
variables. See Kenneth D. Bailey, Cluster Analysis, 6 SOC. METHODOLOGY 59, 61 (1975). It is
a way of drawing boundaries around things that generally behave similarly and, as such, it is
widely applied in the social sciences, data mining, and even biology. See BRIAN S. EVERITT,
SABINE LANDAU, MORVEN LEESE & DANIEL STAHL, CLUSTER ANALYSIS 1–13 (5th ed. 2011);
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF GENE EXPRESSION MICROARRAY DATA (Terry Speed ed., 2003);
ANDREW R. WEBB, STATISTICAL PATTERN RECOGNITION 361–62 (2d ed. 2002). For example, a
sociologist may find that several characteristics (independent variables like age, location, and
sex) help explain a given behavior (some dependent variable). Male urban youths ages thirteen
to eighteen tend to behave similarly in one respect, while female suburban youths ages thirteen
to eighteen behave similar to each other. The two groups can create two or more clusters,
depending on the method of analysis and research goal. Cluster analysis does not suggest that
all data points in a given cluster are identical or always behave similarly. Rather, they are
similar across a closed subset of variables; they may behave differently across a different set
of independent variables or relative to different dependent variables. There are myriad methods for determining clusters. Hierarchical clustering is based on the idea that objects are more
related to objects nearby than objects far away. It employs algorithmic and graphical analysis
to determine clusters. See B. S. Everitt, Unresolved Problems in Cluster Analysis, 35
BIOMETRICS 169, 170–77 (1979); Baibing Li, A New Approach to Cluster Analysis: The
Clustering-Function-Based Method, 68 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 457, 457 (2006). For this
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Several cases, all of which are summarized in Table I,56 illustrate that argument:
corporate inventors often do not need nondisclosure agreements; lone entrepreneurs
do. And corporate norms of confidentiality—among employees and between companies in arm’s length dealing—are usually respected, whereas the more informal,
but no less powerful confidentiality norms of social friends and other interpersonal
networks are often ignored. This is another effect of using privacy-as-control in the
public use context: because it offers no clear guidelines on what happens to information after it is no longer a literal secret, it allows judges to privilege certain forms
of control over others.
Table 1. Public use bar cases comparing type of inventor and nondisclosure agreements with
result.

Case

Inventor Cluster
(A=Corp. Inventor;
B=Solo
Entrepreneur)

Disclosure
Event

Signed
Secrecy or
Confidentiality
Agreement?

Public
Use?

Xerox Corp. v.
3Com Corp.

A (Inventor in course
of employment for
large company)

To chair of
conference

No

No

Pronova
BioPharma Norge
AS v. Teva
Pharmaceuticals
USA, Inc.

A (For large
chemical company)

Samples sent
to doctor for
testing

No

Yes

Article, I plotted, in two-dimensional space, the relationship between inventor identity defined
by connection to and invention support by an employer and public use result in the cases in
Figure I. Relative size and strength of employer was based on available corporate revenue data
from Bloomberg or Hoover.com. Cluster A consists of engineers, programmers, and other
inventors employed by large corporations who invent devices in course of their employment
and with the institutional support of their employers. Cluster A includes experts at Xerox,
biochemists at large pharmaceutical companies, and mechanical engineers at Honeywell, for
example. Cluster B consists of students, hobbyists, and experts inventing in their spare time.
The members of these groups were similar to each other on the relevant variables. Three cases
were eliminated from consideration because, given the facts, clustering would have been arbitrary. Subsequent research could probe whether some small- or medium-sized businesses
are treated fairly in the public use context.
56. The cases analyzed in this Article were chosen from a Westlaw search for reported
Federal Circuit and district court cases after January 1, 1985 with the following search: “public
use” & patent. That search resulted in 304 cases. Because a relatively in-depth discussion of
the public use bar was necessary for analyzing its application, cases where “public use” was
merely mentioned and not discussed or discussed in passing were eliminated, reducing the
data set to ninety-seven. A series of cases that seemed to hinge on the public use bar were
actually “on sale” bar cases. Those were also eliminated from the data set, reducing the number
to eighty-eight. For the remaining cases, only those cases where it was possible to identify any
information about the nature of the parties, whether they fell into Cluster A or Cluster B, were
included.
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(A=Corp. Inventor;
B=Solo
Entrepreneur)

Disclosure
Event
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Signed
Secrecy or
Confidentiality
Agreement?

Public
Use?

Bernhardt, L.L.C.
v. Collezione
Europa USA, Inc.

A (President of one
of the largest familyrun furniture companies in United States)

Display at
industry trade
show

No

No

Dey, L.P. v.
Sunovion Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

A (Big Pharma)

Clinical trials

Yes and No

No

Lough v.
Brunswick Corp.

B (Repairman)

Installed on
friends’ boats

No

Yes

MIT v. Harman
Int’l Indus., Inc.

B (Students)

Testing and
demos

No

Maybe

Minnesota Mining
& Mfg. v. Appleton Papers Inc.

A (Company
president)

Distributed to
thousands of
employees

No

Yes

Beachcombers,
Int’l, Inc. v.
WildeWood
Creative Prods.,
Inc.

B (Part-time
inventor)

Demo and
use for 20–30
invited guests
at inventor’s
home

No

Yes

Baxter Int’l, Inc. v.
Cobe Labs., Inc.

B (Researcher)

Demos and
free flow
through lab

No

Yes

Moleculon
Research Corp. v.
CBS, Inc.

A (Graduate student,
but large company
defending validity)

Shown to
friends,
roommate,
chemistry
department
colleagues,
employer
(who sent it
to 50–60 toy
companies)

No

No

Am. Seating Co. v.
USSC Grp., Inc.

A (Spare-time
inventor, but large
company defending
validity)

Demos to
friends and
colleagues for
feedback

No

No

In re Hamilton

B (Lone inventor)

Test runs

No

Yes

Nat’l Research
Dev. Corp. v.
Varian Assocs,
Inc.

B (Graduate
students)

Adviser
disclosed to
individual at
conference

No

Yes

Delano Farms Co.
v. Cal. Table
Grape Comm’n

A (Owners of large
grape growing
company)

Distributed
grape
varieties to
friends/family

No

No
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Case

Inventor Cluster
(A=Corp. Inventor;
B=Solo
Entrepreneur)

Disclosure
Event
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Signed
Secrecy or
Confidentiality
Agreement?

Public
Use?

Invitrogen Corp. v.
Biocrest Mfg.,
L.P.

A
(For large company)

Used
internally in
company

No

No

Netscape
Commc’ns Corp.
v. Konrad

B
(Staff scientist, parttime inventor)

Shown to
colleague

No

Yes

Motionless
Keyboard Co. v.
Microsoft Corp.

B (Part-time
inventor)

Shown to
friends and
potential
investor

Yes

No

Petrolite Corp. v.
Baker Hughes Inc.

A (For large
chemical company)

Testing

No

Yes

Honeywell Int’l
Inc. v. Universal
Avionics Sys.
Corp.

A (For large aviation
company)

Demos of
plane with
reporter on
board

No

No

Allied Colloids
Inc. v. Am.
Cyanamid Co.

A (Large chemical
company)

Testing
process to
win back
commercial
contract with
city

No

No

Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Zenith Goldline
Pharm., Inc.

A (Big Pharma)

Open clinical
trials

No

No

JumpSport, Inc. v.
Jumpking, Inc.

B (Hobbyist
inventor)

Used by
several
neighbors in
inventor’s
backyard

No

Yes

Manville Sales
Corp. v.
Paramount Sys.,
Inc.

A (Researcher in
course of
employment for large
company)

Drawings
distributed
and invention
testing in
pilot

Yes

No

New Railhead
Mfg., L.L.C. v.
Vermeer Mfg. Co.

A (Company
president)

Used by acquaintance at
public job site

No

Yes

Eolas Tech. Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp.

B (Student)

Demos to 2
Sun
Microsystems
employees

No

Yes
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1. The Privileged Position of the Corporate Inventor: Confidentiality Agreements
Courts tend to give corporate inventors the benefit of the doubt on their public use
defenses. When the disclosing party is a corporate inventor, rules are generally flexible, seemingly applied with the goal of protecting the corporation’s patents. Nondisclosure agreements are rarely required and informal industry norms of confidentiality are often respected.
Of the twenty-five public use cases included in this analysis, ten involve Cluster
A (corporate) defendants that won findings of nonpublic use despite disclosures occurring without formal confidentiality agreements.57 At the same time, ten Cluster B
(solo entrepreneur) defendants faced the opposite result—no confidentiality agreement and a finding of public use.58 But beyond just the results, courts’ perspectives
on the importance of formal confidentiality agreements also change based on the type
of public use defendant. For corporate inventors, rules are flexible; for lone entrepreneurs, confidentiality agreements are constructively essential. In Dey, L.P. v.
Sunovion Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,59 a case involving two large pharmaceutical companies, the Federal Circuit determined that use of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) medication in clinical trials did not constitute public use even though
the subjects involved never signed confidentiality agreements.60 The court recognized that clinical trial subjects customarily do not sign confidentiality agreements;
to require one in this case would ignore the contextual factors that implied a baseline
of confidentiality regardless of any agreement.61 To reinforce that flexible approach,
the court even admonished the district court below for its overly formalistic reliance
on executed agreements.62 And in Bernhardt, L.L.C. v. Collezione Europa USA,
Inc.,63 where one of the largest family-owned furniture companies in the United

57. See Delano Farms Co. v. Cal. Table Grape Comm’n, 778 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir.
2015); Dey, L.P. v. Sunovion Pharm., Inc., 715 F.3d 1351, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Am.
Seating Co. v. USSC Grp., Inc., 514 F.3d 1262, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Honeywell Int’l Inc. v.
Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 488 F.3d 982, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith
Goldline Pharm., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest
Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Bernhardt, L.L.C. v. Collezione Europa
USA, Inc., 386 F.3d 1371, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp., 26 F. Supp.
2d 492, 495 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Allied Colloids Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570 (Fed.
Cir. 1995); Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
58. See Motionless Keyboard Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 1376, 1384–85 (Fed. Cir.
2007); JumpSport, Inc. v. Jumpking, Inc., 191 F. App’x. 926, 935 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Eolas Tech.
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Netscape Commc’ns Corp. v.
Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Cobe Labs., Inc., 88 F.3d
1054, 1058, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1121–22 (Fed. Cir.
1996); Beachcombers, Int’l v. WildeWood Creative Prods., Inc., 31 F.3d 1154, 1160 (Fed. Cir.
1994); Nat’l Research Dev. Corp. v. Varian Assocs., Inc., No. 93-1421, 1994 WL 18963, *2–3
(Fed. Cir. Jan. 26, 1994); In re Hamilton, 882 F.2d 1576, 1580–81 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Mass. Inst.
of Tech. v. Harman Int’l Indus., Inc., 584 F. Supp. 2d 297, 313 (D. Mass. 2008).
59. 715 F.3d 1351.
60. Id. at 1354.
61. Id. at 1357–58.
62. Id. at 1357.
63. 386 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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States displayed patented material at an industry trade show that did not require
signed confidentiality agreements,64 the court noted that a formal secrecy agreement
“is one factor to be considered” and immediately reframed the analysis as a totality
of the circumstances test for inventor control in context. 65
But courts are rarely so charitable and flexible in cases involving Cluster B (solo
entrepreneur) defendants. In Baxter International, Inc. v. Cobe Laboratories, Inc.,66
for example, the Federal Circuit found that the use of a centrifuge by a National
Institutes of Health researcher in his personal laboratory constituted disqualifying
public use because he maintained no control over the device. 67 The most important
factor leaning against control seemed to be the fact that the inventor demonstrated
the technology to colleagues without a confidentiality agreement or any indication
that it should be kept secret.68 In Lough v. Brunswick Corp.,69 a corrosion-proof seal
for stern drives was tested on boats belonging to several of the inventor’s friends and
colleagues.70 The court determined that the use was public because the inventor
lacked any control over the seals: he asked for no follow up, did not supervise their
use, and never asked his friends to sign confidentiality agreements. 71 And in
Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. Harman International Industries, Inc.,72 inventors used their friends to test a car navigation system, but never required confidentiality agreements from them or corporate sponsors. 73 In each of these cases, the
lack of a confidentiality agreement between the parties, though ostensibly only one
of many factors to consider, was always among the most important.
The narrative in Beachcombers, International, Inc. v. WildeWood Creative
Products, Inc.74 makes the point even more clear. In that case, the designer and developer of an improved kaleidoscope wanted to solicit feedback on the design from
her friends and colleagues.75 She invited twenty to thirty of them to a private party at
her home for a demonstration and, without asking them to sign a confidentiality
agreement, allowed her guests to handle the invention. 76 The situation had all the
indicia of a controlled social event: an invite-only guest list consisting of friends and

64. Id. at 1374.
65. Id. at 1379–80 (quoting Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1266
(Fed. Cir. 1986)).
66. 88 F.3d 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
67. Id. at 1059.
68. Id. at 1058–59 (reasoning that the inventor’s “lack of effort to maintain the centrifuge
as confidential coupled with the free flow into his laboratory of people, including visitors to
NIH, who observed the centrifuge in operation and who were under no duty of confidentiality”
necessitated a finding of “public use.”).
69. 86 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
70. Id. at 1116.
71. Id. at 1120–21. “The last factor of control is critically important . . . .” Id. at 1120.
72. 584 F. Supp. 2d 297 (D. Mass. 2008).
73. Id. at 303–04.
74. 31 F.3d 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
75. Id. at 1156, 1159.
76. Id. at 1159–60 (noting that the inventor “personally demonstrated the device to some
of the guests for the purpose of getting feedback on the device; . . . she made no efforts to
conceal the device or keep anything about it secret”); Brief for Defendant-Appellee,
WildeWood Creative Prods., Inc. at 11, Beachcombers, 31 F.3d 1154 (No. 93-1258).
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colleagues who were invited for the purposes of testing, experimentation, and feedback. The only thing missing was a formal secrecy agreement. Without it, though,
the use was considered sufficiently public for two reasons: first, the kaleidoscope
was out of the developer’s control during the party; second, she placed no restrictions
on guests sharing what they learned.
The correlation may not be perfect: there are several examples listed in Table I
where Cluster A defendants lose their public use cases in part because they failed to
secure confidentiality agreements. But, in this case, the exceptions help prove the
rule. Like those involving Cluster B defendants above, the opinions in these cases
elevate formal secrecy agreements to almost determinative status. In Pronova
BioPharma Norge AS v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,77 for example, where a
pharmaceutical company sent drug samples to an outside doctor for testing, 78 the
court’s holding highlighted the central importance of a confidentiality agreement,
concluding the public use happened when samples were sent “with no confidentiality
restrictions.”79 Pronova and cases like Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. v.
Appleton Papers Inc.,80 Petrolite Corp. v. Baker Hughes Inc.,81 and New Railhead
Manufacturing, L.L.C. v. Vermeer Manufacturing Co.82 may not rest exclusively on
the lack of formal confidentiality agreements. But the pattern is unmistakable: a nondisclosure contract is, in practice, more important than the black letter law would
suggest.83
This is a boon to corporate inventors even when they lose. Although simple nondisclosure agreements are freely available online, 84 solo entrepreneurs, part-time developers, and hobbyists lack the power and leverage to insist on confidentiality
agreements from their business partners. Nor do they have the money to pay attorneys to draft professional ones. As courts and scholars have noted in the corporate
and labor contexts, small businesses lack the bargaining power of large, entrenched
interests.85 During its onboarding process for new hires, for example, Apple devotes

77. 549 F. App’x 934 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
78. Id. at 942.
79. Id. at 939.
80. 35 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1149 (D. Minn. 1999) (“No 3M employee was asked to sign a
secrecy agreement before using them. And 3M announced no special company-wide policy
regarding [the invention’s] use or circulation.”).
81. 96 F.3d 1423, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Moreover, there was no evidence that Quaker
had entered into any secrecy agreement with Sohio . . . .”).
82. 298 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (no confidentiality agreement).
83. See Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(stating that a formal confidentiality agreement is supposed to be just one of many nondeterminative factors).
84. A Google search for “free nondisclosure agreement sample” retrieved 1.8 million hits
in less than half a second. GOOGLE, https://www.google.com (search: free nondisclosure
agreement sample).
85. See Kenneth M. Casebeer, Supreme Court Without a Clue: 14 Penn Plaza LLC v.
Pyett and the System of Collective Action and Collective Bargaining Established by the
National Labor Relations Act, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1063, 1066–67, 1067 n.18 (2011) (discussing unequal bargaining power between corporations and individuals); see also Postal
Instant Press, Inc. v. Sealy, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 373–74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (noting
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an entire week to confidentiality and requires employees sign several long, overlapping nondisclosure agreements and agree to abide by the company’s well-known
lock-down and secrecy practices.86 A start-up would have difficulty attracting necessary talent if it copied Apple’s practice.
2. The Privileged Position of the Corporate Inventor: Norms of Confidentiality
Corporate privilege in public use law extends beyond a more flexible approach to
formal confidentiality agreements. Indeed, the reason why so many Cluster A defendants that fail to secure secrecy commitments win their public use cases is because
courts are willing to fill the gap left by a contract with industry norms and customs
of confidentiality. They almost never do the same for Cluster B (solo entrepreneur)
inventors. The unequal application is two steps back from what would have otherwise been a step forward toward a flexible, social network–oriented approach to public use.
A comparison of two cases—Bernhardt and Beachcombers—puts this corporate
privilege in relief. Neither case featured signed confidentiality agreements, yet
Bernhardt won its case, whereas the inventor in Beachcombers lost. Bernhardt owned
several design patents for furniture, 87 all of which were displayed in their entirety at
an exhibition for industry in advance of a large annual trade show. The exhibition
was by invitation only, and entry required identification at several points. Bernhardt
representatives were also available to escort attendees around and answer questions.88 Attendees included sixty-nine of Bernhardt’s customers and newspaper reporters from Furniture Today.89 For the Federal Circuit, the lack of confidentiality
agreements, the arguable commercial motive for inviting customers, and the presence
of reporters did not make Bernhardt’s disclosure of its designs public. Rather, the
entirety of the social context of disclosure suggested that norms of confidentiality
were in place. The court’s conclusion is worth quoting in full:
While it is clear that [exhibition] attendees were not required to sign confidentiality agreements, . . . in the circumstances of this case, confidentiality agreements were unnecessary. At trial, Bernhardt presented the testimony . . . that although no confidentiality agreement was provided to
Pre-Market attendees, “[i]t’s pretty well understood that confidentiality
applies to premarket [sic].” . . . Pre-Market attendees have an incentive
not to divulge Bernhardt’s designs, because they would not be able to
participate if they divulged the Pre-Market designs. . . . Pre-Market was

inequality of bargaining power between small businesses and large corporations and acknowledging that “[b]efore the [franchise] relationship is established, abuse is threatened by the
franchisor’s use of contracts of adhesion presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis”) (quoting
E.S. Bills, Inc. v. Tzucanow, 700 P.2d 1280, 1288 (Cal. 1985) (Mosk, J., concurring)).
86. See, e.g., Jay Yarow, What It’s Like on Day One as an Apple Employee, BUS. INSIDER
(Jan. 26, 2012 11:39 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-its-like-on-day-one-as-anapple-employee-2012-1 [https://perma.cc/58PJ-JTUB].
87. Bernhardt, L.L.C. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 386 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
88. Id. at 1374.
89. Id. at 1379.
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not open to the public, that the identification of attendees was checked
against a list of authorized names both by building security and later at a
reception desk near the showroom, that attendees were escorted through
the showroom, and that attendees were not permitted to make written
notes or take photographs inside the showroom. 90
The evidence of industry confidentiality norms and expectations—that it is “pretty
well understood that confidentiality applies to” the exhibition—came from
Bernhardt’s general manager.91 The court did what it should: look at the entirety of
the social context of a given disclosure and respect the norms of confidentiality emanating from that context.
The Federal Circuit changes its tune when the inventor is a solo entrepreneur. In
Beachcombers, for example, the designer of a new kaleidoscope disclosed her design
in a context at least comparable, if not more private, to the exhibition in Bernhardt.
She hosted twenty to thirty friends and colleagues at an invite-only cocktail gathering
at her home, demonstrated the kaleidoscope and its unique characteristics, and asked
for feedback. No members of the press were present. Nor were customers invited;
the inventor had no customers.92 Despite the contextual evidence of implied confidentiality and privacy—an invite-only social gathering at a private home with testimony from the inventor that the purpose of the event was to gain feedback—the court
concluded that the demonstrations constituted invalidating public use based on testimony from one of the guests, contradicted by the inventor, that confidentiality was
not implied.93 In other words, the court was comfortable with ignoring social norms
and elevating the importance of a confidentiality agreement when the inventor was
creating in her spare time.
If the disparate treatment of corporate and solo inventors is insufficiently clear
from Bernhardt and Beachcombers, the contrast between Xerox Corp. v. 3Com
Corp.94 and National Research Development Corp. v. Varian Associates 95 is even
starker. In Xerox, a Cluster A case, a company employee developed, in the course of
his employment, a technique for more efficient computer recognition of
handwriting.96 The alleged invalidating public use was the inventor’s submission of
a videotape of himself demonstrating the invention to chairpersons of an industry
conference at which he wanted to present. No confidentiality agreement accompanied the videotape.97 But the court said this was not public use because industry
norms said otherwise: “[a]s a matter of formal policy and procedure as well as professional courtesy and practice, [the conference] review committees treat every submission confidentially.”98 There may have been no binding secrecy agreement, the

90. Id. at 1381 ([sic] in original) (citations omitted).
91. Id.
92. Beachcombers Int’l v. WildeWood Creative Prods., Inc., 31 F.3d 1154, 1159–60 (Fed.
Cir. 1994).
93. Id. at 1160.
94. 26 F. Supp. 2d 492 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
95. No. 93-1421, 1994 WL 18963 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 26, 1994).
96. Xerox, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 492–93.
97. Id. at 493–94.
98. Id. at 496 (first alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
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court noted, but conference organizers were “under a professional ethical obligation”
to maintain confidentiality.99
Such norms were ignored in National Research Development Corp. That case involved a graduate student who invented a method for improving nuclear magnetic
resonance sample analysis,100 the “essence” of which was disclosed by the student’s
adviser to a long-standing friend at a scientific conference.101 Admittedly, there may
be a difference between disclosure to a conference organizer and an attendee, but the
court in National Research Development Corp. emphasized the lack of a confidentiality agreement and the conference goal of encouraging open dialogue rather than
the norms of confidentiality inherent in friendship and at academic conferences. 102
The former set of considerations went unmentioned in Xerox, highlighting both the
contrasting result and perspectives and language that appear to differ based on the
category of the inventor.
C. Implications of Uneven Application of the Public Use Bar
That courts tend to treat corporate inventors and solo entrepreneurs differently is
itself a concern. Our laws, in general, and intellectual property laws, in particular,
should be applied dispassionately, evenly, and absent discrimination. There are three
additional implications of public use law’s privileged treatment of corporate inventors, two of which are practical and one is theoretical. After discussing these implications, the balance of this Article proposes a solution that responds to all three
concerns.
First, the unequal treatment makes patent defense harder and more expensive, directly increasing barriers to entry into the innovation economy for a wide swath of
the inventing class. Obtaining a patent is already an expensive ordeal.103 Additional
costs from the likelihood of future (unsuccessful) litigation 104 further discourages
entrepreneurs. Litigation increases costs and decreases the net present value of a
patent, and uncertainty in litigation outcome, evidenced by courts’ uneven and

99. Id.
100. Nat’l Research Dev. Corp., 1994 WL 18963 at *1.
101. Id.
102. Id. at *3.
103. David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L. REV.
677, 685, 690 (2012). The average patent will cost the applicant approximately $22,000 to
successfully prosecute, id. at 690, although this number may be conservative, with some costs
reaching $30,000, id. at 690 n.39. Notably, these estimates do not include the potentially devastating effect of a patent being declared invalid.
104. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes,
99 CORNELL L. REV. 387, 400 (2014) (stating that the average legal cost to defend a patent suit
ranges from “$420,000 for small and medium-sized companies to $1.52 million for large
companies”); Inventive Warfare, ECONOMIST (Aug. 20, 2011), http://www.economist.com
/node/21526385 [https://perma.cc/RFP6-B77E]; David Schwartz, Claim Construction
Reversal Rates I - Overall Reversal Rates, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 27, 2008), http://www.patentlyo
.com/patent/2008/02/claim-construct.html [https://perma.cc/9HBT-YNL3] (tabulating claim
construction reversal rates as high as 43.5%).
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sometimes haphazard application of public use, increases costs significantly.105 That
they are more likely to fail to protect their patents may also discourage entrepreneurs
from entering the patent process, opting, in some cases, for trade secrecy 106 or
declining to innovate in the first place.
Second, the pattern of favoring corporate inventors entrenches an already unequal
and strikingly homogenous patent landscape. According to the Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO), nearly all of the top 100 patentees in 2014 were large corporations,107
which, although not itself evidence of inequality—large corporations with many employees likely have more inventions—feeds a larger narrative of entrenched privilege. For example, women remain a distinct minority among science and technology
graduates108 employed in inventor roles at large corporations.109 If male-dominated
corporations continue to control the patent world, the contributions of women and
other minorities could still be minimized.110 A recent study of 4.6 million utility patents granted by the PTO between 1976 and 2013 found that “[w]omen contributed
less than 8% of all inventorships for the entire period,” maxing out at 10.8% in 2013,
an increase from 2.7% in 1976.111 Men dominate patenting in almost every country,

105. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 555–59 (4th ed. 1992) (arguing that as stakes and uncertainty increase, the probability of settlement decreases and litigation costs increase); see also Christopher M. Holman, Unpredictability in Patent Law and Its
Effect on Pharmaceutical Innovation, 76 MO. L. REV. 645 (2011).
106. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP
Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311 (2008); Andrew A. Schwartz, The Corporate Preference for
Trade Secret, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 623 (2013).
107. See PATENT TECH. MONITORING TEAM, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTS
BY ORGANIZATION (2014), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/topo_14.htm
[https://perma.cc/MB4M-S5T6]. See also Annette I. Kahler, Examining Exclusion in WomanInventor Patenting: A Comparison of Educational Trends and Patent Data in the Era of
Computer Engineer Barbie®, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 773, 785–89 (2011).
108. NAT’L SCI. FOUND., WOMEN, MINORITIES, AND PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES IN SCIENCE
AND ENGINEERING 6–7 (2015) (stating that women receive bachelor’s degrees in certain science fields at far lower rates than men, including computer sciences (18.2%), engineering
(19.2%), physics (19.1%), and mathematics and statistics (43.1%)).
109. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK
35–36 (2014) (reporting that 39% of chemists and material scientists are women; 27.9% of
environmental scientists and geoscientists are women; 15.6% of chemical engineers are
women; 12.1% of civil engineers are women; 8.3% of electrical and electronics engineers are
women; 17.2% of industrial engineers are women; and 7.2% of mechanical engineers are
women).
110. For a discussion of using evidence of patents as a measure of economic innovation,
please see, for example, JACOB SCHMOOKLER, INVENTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 18–56
(1966); Bjørn L. Basberg, Patents and the Measurement of Technological Change: A Survey
of the Literature, 16 RES. POL’Y 131 (1987); Zvi Griliches, Patent Statistics Indicators as
Economic Indicators: A Survey, 28 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1661 (1990); Zvi Griliches, Ariel
Pakes & Bronwyn H. Hall, The Value of Patents as Indicators of Inventive Activity, (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 2083).
111. Cassidy R. Sugimoto, Chaoqun Ni, Jevin D. West & Vincent Larivière, The Academic
Advantage: Gender Disparities in Patenting 5, PLOS ONE (2015), http://journals.plos.org
/plosone/article/asset?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0128000.PDF [https://perma.cc/MZ3C-BQPU].
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with forty-two countries listing no female inventors whatsoever.112 Among academic
life science patentees, women patent at about 40% the rate of men.113 And gender
inequality in the patent world does not stop there: historically, women were not only
discouraged from claiming credit for their inventions; their innovations were actively
co-opted by husbands, fathers, brothers, and other men around them. 114 As Dan Burk
has suggested, the continued underrepresentation of women among patentees and
patent examiners may suggest that the “system retains some residue” of more overt
historical discrimination.115 Any part of that system that privileges corporate
inventors to the exclusion of a more diverse innovator pool may contribute to that
residual imbalance.
Underlying these practical problems is a broader doctrinal failure. At its heart, the
public use bar is about disclosure, a transfer of information from one person to another. As such, it is a distinctly social phenomenon that is fact specific and highly
contextual.116 And yet the principles of privacy-as-control, which, as discussed
above,117 locate analysis within the disclosing party rather than in the social context
of disclosure, dominate the doctrine. Judges tend to focus on the inventor’s volitional
acts and secondarily, if at all, consider the context in which those acts occurred. Only
rarely are social norms respected like they are in Bernhardt, and when they are, corporate inventors are usually the beneficiaries.
In cases like Bernhardt, Dey, and American Seating, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that the relationship between the inventor and those to whom she discloses her
invention should matter because certain relationships could give rise to an expectation of confidentiality. In Bernhardt, the court accepted that participants in the premarket furniture show could have a custom of confidentiality based on their status as
industry partners.118 In Dey, the court recognized that patients in clinical trials typically do not sign confidentiality agreements, so, given that custom, none should be
required in this case.119 And in American Seating, the Federal Circuit affirmed that
even without confidentiality agreements, the disclosure to a business partner who

112. Id.; see also U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUTTONS
BIOTECH: 1996 UPDATE REPORT WITH SUPPLEMENTAL DATA THROUGH 1998: U.S.
PATENTING BY WOMEN, 1977 TO 1996 (1999), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip
/taf/wom_98.pdf [https://perma.cc/5R44-9JRJ].
113. Waverly W. Ding, Fiona Murray & Toby E. Stuart, Gender Differences in Patenting
in the Academic Life Sciences, 313 SCIENCE 665, 666 (2006).
114. Kahler, supra note 107, at 779–80; see also, e.g., JUDY WAJCMAN, FEMINISM
CONFRONTS TECHNOLOGY 16 (1991); B. Zorina Khan, Married Women’s Property Laws and
Female Commercial Activity: Evidence from United States Patent Records, 1790–1895, 56 J.
ECON. HIST. 356, 358 (1996); Deborah J. Merritt, Hypatia in the Patent Office: Women
Inventors and the Law, 1865–1900, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 235, 290 (1991); Carroll Pursell,
The Cover Design: Women Inventors in America, 22 TECH. & CULTURE 545, 546 (1981).
115. Dan L. Burk, Do Patents Have Gender?, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y, & L. 881,
887 (2011).
116. Waldman, supra note 5, at 593 (“[P]rivacy is a social phenomenon not merely because
other people exist, but because privacy is about the social circumstances in which information
flows from one party to another.”).
117. See supra notes 29–48 and accompanying text.
118. Bernhardt, L.L.C. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 386 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
119. Dey, L.P. v. Sunovion Pharm., Inc., 715 F.3d 1351, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
TO
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helped build the invention and the internal demonstration to the inventor’s employees
were both done in contexts of implied confidentiality.120
But those relationships are ignored in Cluster B (solo entrepreneur) cases. If anything, the relationships between the parties in Beachcombers (friends and colleagues), Lough (friends and colleagues), and MIT (friends) were closer than the relationships in Bernhardt (participants in the same business), Dey (clinical trial
designers and subjects), and American Seating (business partners and employees),
and yet all three of the former lost their public use cases. Elsewhere, district courts,
the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court have gone out of their way to disclaim
any relevance of the relationship between the parties for determining confidentiality
or control.121 However, disclosures of all kinds happen in context—one that, I argue,
is characterized by trust.
II. TRUST AND SOCIAL NETWORK CONFIDENTIALITY
To address these doctrinal and practical deficiencies, this Article proposes a reorientation of public use law around three principles: that it should (1) apply equally
and evenly to corporate and entrepreneurial inventors alike; (2) retain fidelity to the
goals of patent law, in general, and the public use bar, in particular; and (3) reflect
the social context of disclosure.122 Though hardly controversial, these elements have
been missing from the doctrine and its application: the law adheres to the individualfocused conception of privacy-as-control, privileges corporate inventors over solo
entrepreneurs, and perversely discourages patenting among some innovators.
The public use bar is a limitation on disclosure. Social scientists have shown that
there are several factors at play in the disclosure of information to small groups:
norms of trust, the structure of the network in which the information is disclosed, the
nature of the information itself, and the relationship between the disclosing party and
the members of her network.123 Together, these factors help explain why individuals
disclose private information to others and determine the circumstances in which information disclosed to a small group will escape to a larger one. We can apply these
factors to achieve our goal of fair public use jurisprudence. I argue that different
networks can develop powerful norms of confidentiality and discretion—commonly

120. Am. Seating Co. v. USSC Grp., Inc., 514 F.3d 1262, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
121. See, e.g., Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Harman Int’l Indus., 584 F. Supp. 2d 297, 313 (D.
Mass. 2008) (“The Supreme Court has held, however, that even the use of an invention by the
inventor’s wife or romantic interest could be an invalidating public use. Therefore, the identity
of the drivers does not, by itself, prevent the field trials from being a ‘public use.’” (citation
omitted) (citing Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 335–38 (1881))).
122. For more discussion of the social context of disclosure, see, for example, Nissenbaum,
supra note 28, at 120 (arguing that “contextual integrity is the appropriate benchmark of
privacy”); Waldman, supra note 5.
123. The discussion that follows is based on extensive social science research from the
author’s doctoral studies and reflects the contributions of legal scholars like Lior Strahilevitz,
whose article, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, bridged social network and privacy
scholarship, Strahilevitz, supra note 43, and Duncan Watts’s groundbreaking work on socalled “small world networks,” DUNCAN J. WATTS, SIX DEGREES: THE SCIENCE OF A
CONNECTED AGE (2003).
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understood as trust—on which individuals (and inventors) should be able to rely.
When disclosures happen in these contexts of trust, they are not public and should
be protected as such.
In this section, I summarize the basic principles of social network theory and what
I have called privacy-as-trust; capture the lessons of that literature for disclosure and
public use contexts; translate those lessons into a flexible, network-based, and administrable tool for public use cases; and show how elements of this proposal will
not only advance the policy goals of patent law, but are also readily reflected across
intellectual property regimes.
A. A Theory of Trust and Information Flow
Social network theory gets us part of the way to our goal. It helps explain how
and why certain information may flow through a network and into another, wider
network, and why other types of disclosure may not. But it does not explain why we
share in the first place. This is the role of trust—specifically, what sociologists call
“particular social trust.” Together, trust and social network theory provide a step-bystep model that assesses the reasonableness of disclosures and the likelihood of subsequent publicity. They are perfect tools for public use law reform.
1. Social Networks and Information Diffusion
Social network theory is the cross-disciplinary study of how the structure of networks affects behavior.124 A network is just a set of objects125—people, cells, power
plants—with connections among them—social encounters, synapses, grids. They are
all around us: a family is a (social) network, as is the (neural) network in a brain and
the (distribution) network of trash pick-up routes in New York City. To see one visualization of diffusion through a network, 126 dab the nib of a marker into the middle
of a piece of construction paper and you will see, in real time, the diffusion of ink
from one origin point, or node, through the lattice-like network of fibers that make
up the paper. Facebook is the paradigmatic modern social network: its overarching
network has billions of nodes (members),127 but it also has billions of subnetworks,
where nodes overlap, interact, and share information. It is a network’s ability to invite, disseminate, and retain information that concerns us.
As Lior Strahilevitz has shown, the theory of information flow within and among
networks can begin the discussion of when information disclosed to a small group is
still private.128 It helps establish two important conclusions: that both the structure of

124. WATTS, supra note 123, at 28.
125. Id. at 27.
126. Network structure is diverse. A simple search of “network visualization” in Google
Images shows the wide range of visual representations of networks. GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com (search: “network visualization,” then click “Images”).
127. Company Info, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM, http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/
[https://perma.cc/M3R4-8ZCE].
128. Strahilevitz, supra note 43, at 946–73. For Professor Strahilevitz, the conversation
starts and ends with social network theory. But see Waldman, supra note 5, at 594–95, 625–28.
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a network and the nature of information disclosed into it affect the flow of information through and beyond it.
Although networks are evolving ecosystems 129—people constantly drop in and
out—human social networks tend to be close knit and highly “clustered,” 130 with
“strong ties” linking us to our friends. 131 Family members are good examples of individuals with strong ties: everyone knows everyone else and each member engages
in repeated social interactions with each other. They spend a lot of time together,
have deep emotional connections, and reciprocate the connection with each other.132
Members of other tightly clustered networks—support groups, recreational sports
teams, individuals with the same political beliefs—share with each other. Social network theory does not tell us precisely why these persons feel comfortable sharing
personal information with each other, but it does explain one form of information
diffusion: the stronger the tie between two individuals, the more likely their friends
overlap, and the more likely information will stay within those close-knit overlapping
networks. For example, Michelle tells her best friend Nicole about her idea for a new
mobile app, hoping Nicole will give her some advice. Nicole may tell Opher, her
husband and Michelle’s childhood friend. In this network, Michelle’s mobile app
idea is unlikely to spread. If networks only had strong ties, we would see many
groups of friends that recycle information among themselves. 133 Based on this research, we can conclude that disclosures among close-knit strong ties will rarely diffuse to the wider public.
Information is spread between different clusters through what Mark Granovetter
has called “weak ties.”134 Some weak ties are “supernodes,” or society’s socialites:135
they have friends in different groups and make connections among them. One example might be an in-law. My sister is part of my close-knit family network; her husband is part of his. If he is indeed close to his family and a social person, he could
perform the function of a network bridge, making connections between our two very
different families.
More often than not, though, people are linked by the acquaintances they share
—two strangers on a train marveling that they have the same mutual friend.136 These
weak-tie bridges, Professor Granovetter has shown, are the driving force behind

129. WATTS, supra note 123, at 28.
130. Id. at 40; Strahilevitz, supra note 43, at 951 (citing Ronald S. Burt, Bridge Decay, 24
SOC. NETWORKS 333, 333–34 (2002); Karen Klein Ikkink & Theo van Tilburg, Broken Ties:
Reciprocity and Other Factors Affecting the Termination of Older Adults’ Relationships, 21
SOC. NETWORKS 131, 142–45 (1999)).
131. See Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360, 1361 (1973).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1366 (“If one tells a rumor to all his close friends, and they do likewise, many
will hear the rumor a second and third time, since those linked by strong ties tend to share
friends. . . . [B]ridges will not be crossed.”).
134. Id. (“[W]hatever is to be diffused can reach a larger number of people, and traverse
greater social distance (i.e., path length), when passed through weak ties rather than strong.”
(footnote omitted)).
135. Strahilevitz, supra note 43, at 951.
136. WATTS, supra note 123, at 38, 41. Duncan Watts’s project, the “small world problem,”
is so named after the reaction when two strangers realize they have a friend in common. They
say, “what a small world[!]” Id. at 38.
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information dissemination from one close-knit group to another.137 These weak ties
are acquaintances we don’t know well, but with whom interactions are essential if
we want to bring outside information into a close-knit group full of strong ties.138
Consider another example: Jennifer is a doctor, a soccer mom, and a hiker; she is
friends with her work colleagues, casually acquainted with her child’s teammates’
moms and dads, and close with her hiking buddies, with whom she goes on an annual
trip to Machu Pichu. An occasionally random conversation at work or at a soccer
game about hiking may introduce a love for the outdoors to a soccer dad who has
lived all his life in Manhattan. Professor Granovetter has shown that these types of
weak ties are essential to, among other things, getting jobs:139 weak ties bring in
contacts and information you would not otherwise have received. 140 When there are
no weak ties between individuals otherwise connected by only a few steps, or when
those ties are inactive, those even nearby nodes are highly unlikely to ever encounter
each other or the information they disseminate. They have what Ronald Burt has
called a “structural hole” between them.141 As the active bridges between close-knit
groups, then, weak ties are essential for information diffusion.
But the structure of the network—clustering, distance between clusters, and types
of connections, as well as any exogenous limitations to the network—is not the only
important element. The nature of the information also matters. Weak ties are not
adept at transmitting all types of information. Job openings or rumors are easy to
pass along: they are simple pieces of information that do not degrade along the line
and are, therefore, amenable to transmission during short chance encounters with
acquaintances.142 But studies have shown that they are ill equipped to transfer complex information or aggregate pieces of information into a richer picture. 143 In other
words, weak ties cannot put two and two together to make four; conversations with
acquaintances rarely involve in-depth analysis. Put another way, anyone who has
ever played the game Telephone as a child remembers that simple statements make
it through, but complex ones get mangled.
Professor Strahilevitz illustrated these points using the popular parlor game, “Six
Degrees of Kevin Bacon.”144 Duncan Watts used stories from his own life. 145
Facebook is another helpful, accessible model. Facebook is an evolving ecosystem,

137. Granovetter, supra note 131, at 1366.
138. WATTS, supra note 123, at 49 (citing Granovetter, supra note 131).
139. Granovetter, supra note 131, at 1371–73.
140. Weak ties are, therefore, essential to overcoming the problem Cass Sunstein described
in Republic.com 2.0, where he argued that online social networks contribute to greater political
polarization in society because network algorithms reinforce individuals’ choices to seek out
information with which they already agree. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 46–73 (2007).
141. Strahilevitz, supra note 43, at 952 (quoting RONALD S. BURT, STRUCTURAL HOLES:
THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF COMPETITION 18 (1992)).
142. Morten T. Hansen, The Search-Transfer Problem: The Role of Weak Ties in Sharing
Knowledge Across Organizational Subunits, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 82, 105 (1999) (cited in
Strahilevitz, supra note 43, at 957); Gabriel Weimann, The Strength of Weak Conversational
Ties in the Flow of Information and Influence, 5 SOC. NETWORKS 245, 254–55 (1983).
143. Strahilevitz, supra note 43, at 957–58.
144. Id. at 949–52.
145. WATTS, supra note 123, passim.
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where new people are always joining and dropping out, changing our own social
networks. The average adult Facebook user has 338 friends146 but “follows” far
fewer, with fewer still showing up on her news feeds. 147 This subnetwork of friends
tends to be close knit, constituted by many overlapping strong ties. But Facebook’s
algorithm, while privileging close friends, allows posts from acquaintances in our
networks to appear on our feeds, as well. These weak ties bring in additional information from outside our closest-knit groups. The type of information also matters:
studies show that status updates, shared links, and photos reach more members of
your network than friendships and wall posts. 148
2. Trust and Sharing
But social network theory does not explain why we share information with
others—strong or weak ties, intimate friends or strangers—in the first place. As an
information flow model, it skips the first step: social network models help explain
how the ink spreads through the construction paper, not why we placed the marker
nib on the paper. But this is essential for developing an administrable model for adjudicating public use cases: the initial disclosure to others has to be reasonable, not
reckless, and one that society, and by extension, the law is willing to protect. 149 This
is the role of trust.150
What sociologists call particular social trust is a resource of social capital between
or among two or more persons concerning the expectations that other members of
their community will behave according to accepted norms. 151 It is the “favorable expectation regarding other people’s actions and intentions,”152 or the belief that others

146. Aaron Smith, 6 New Facts About Facebook, PEW RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (FEB. 3,
2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/02/03/6-new-facts-about-facebook/ [https://
perma.cc/UC7Y-D32F].
147. Sharon Gaudin, Facebook Gives Priority to Friends in News Feed Change,
COMPUTER WORLD (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2913017/social
-media/facebook-gives-priority-to-friends-in-news-feed-change.html [https://perma.cc/NVL6
-KKHC].
148. Josh Constine, Your Average Facebook Post Only Reaches 12% of Your Friends,
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 29, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/02/29/facebook-post-reach-16
-friends/ [https://perma.cc/RG56-2VWD].
149. This is also true of personal disclosures in the privacy context. Individuals retain privacy rights where they have a legitimate expectation of privacy that society is willing to recognize as reasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
150. Trust has been experiencing a revival of late. In addition to my own work on the
subject, see Waldman, supra note 5 and Waldman, supra note 16, Neil Richards and Woodrow
Hartzog argue that privacy should be conceptualized as a means of building trust. Neil
Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2655719
[https://perma.cc/P6A8-TB62].
151. E.g., Alejandro Portes & Julia Sensenbrenner, Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes
on the Social Determinants of Economic Action, 98 AM. J. SOC. 1320, 1332 (1993).
152. Guido Möllering, The Nature of Trust: From Georg Simmel to a Theory of
Expectation, Interpretation and Suspension, 35 SOC. 403, 404 (2001); see also J. David Lewis
& Andrew Weigert, Trust as a Social Reality, 62 SOC. FORCES 967, 968 (1985); Ken Newton
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will behave in a predictable manner. As such, it deals in expectations and perceptions. For example, if I ask a friend to hold my spare set of keys, I trust she will not
break in and steal from me. When an individual speaks with relative strangers in a
support group like Alcoholics Anonymous, she trusts that they will not divulge her
secrets. I cannot know for certain that my neighbor will not abuse her key privileges
or that my fellow support group members will keep my confidences, so trust allows
me to interact with and rely on them. If I never trusted, my social life would be paralyzed. As Niklas Luhmann stated, trust exists where knowledge ends.153 It is the mutual “faithfulness” on which all social interaction depends.154 And I earn all sorts of
positive rewards as a result.155
Trust is at the core of individuals’ decisions to share personal information with
others.156 From support groups157 to social friends and even websites,158 trust is the
linchpin that gives individuals the comfort and confidence to share. Trust can arise
from explicit or implicit social cues: One may preface a conversation by stating,
“This is to be kept between us.” Or, two people sharing a secret at a party might
physically turn their bodies away from the crowd, huddle down, and whisper. 159 Trust
can also be based on experience—expectations developed over a history of sharing
—and confidentiality.160 Trust and a willingness to disclose may also emanate

& Sonja Zmerli, Three Forms of Trust and Their Association, 3 EUROPEAN POL. SCI. REV. 169,
171 (2011).
153. NIKLAS LUHMANN, TRUST AND POWER 32–38 (John Wiley & Sons 1979); see also
Patricia M. Doney, Joseph P. Cannon & Michael R. Mullen, Understanding the Influence of
National Culture on the Development of Trust, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 601, 603 (1998).
154. See GEORG SIMMEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MONEY 178–79 (1978) (“Without the general trust that people have in each other, society itself would disintegrate, for very few relationships are based entirely upon what is known with certainty about another person, and very
few relationships would endure if trust were not as strong as, or stronger than, rational proof
or personal observation.”).
155. Trust helps us deal with uncertainty and complexity by allowing us to rely on the
recommendations of others. See TALCOTT PARSONS, ACTION THEORY AND THE HUMAN
CONDITION 45–47 (1978). Plus, it encourages therapeutic sharing by giving all individuals,
from alcoholics and those suffering from depression to close friends, the confidence they need
to disclose personal and perhaps stigmatizing information. See, e.g., AARON T. BECK & BRAD
A. ALFORD, DEPRESSION: CAUSES AND TREATMENT 292–324 (2d. ed. 2009). For a more indepth discussion of the social benefits of particular social trust, see Waldman, supra note 5, at
601–05.
156. See Waldman, supra note 16 (providing empirical evidence based on a study of
Facebook users that trust is essential in individuals’ decision to share personal information
online).
157. See, e.g., Gene A. Shelley, H. Russell Bernard, Peter Killworth, Eugene Johnsen &
Christopher McCarty, Who Knows Your HIV Status? What HIV + Patients and Their Network
Members Know About Each Other, 17 SOC. NETWORKS 189, 204 (1995).
158. Timothy Morey, Theodore “Theo” Forbath & Allison Schoop, Customer Data:
Designing for Transparency and Trust, HARV. BUS. REV., May 2015, at 97, https://hbr.org
/2015/05/customer-data-designing-for-transparency-and-trust [https://perma.cc/7T8L-S8PX].
159. These implicit cues of confidentiality are discussed at length in ERVING GOFFMAN,
THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 112–32 (1959) (discussing the “backstage” of
social interaction). See also ERVING GOFFMAN, STRATEGIC INTERACTION (1969).
160. See, e.g., PETER M. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE 98–99 (1964); John
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directly from social network norms and the identities of the network’s members.
Gene Shelley’s study of sharing one’s HIV status with others is a good illustration.
HIV status is, for many, private but not secret: many of the same people that choose
to hide their status from acquaintances, friends, and even family for fear of ostracism,
stigmatization, homophobia, or worse, 161 are willing to share it with relative strangers
who are also living with HIV.162 Several participants in Shelley’s ethnographic study
explained why. For example, one stated: “I would tell my support group. Everyone
there is HIV-positive and I’m comfortable there.” 163 Another stated: “The only two
people, aside from members of my support group and doctors, who know are my
former lover (who gave her the HIV) and my son’s father.”164
Neither the structure of the participants’ networks nor the nature of the information explains why individuals share private information in the first place. It cannot
be the mere fact that a support group is close knit; so is a family, and many respondents adamantly refuse to disclose their status to family members. Individuals
on Facebook share information with different subnetworks of friends, as well, many
of which look like the close-knit networks discussed above.165 The explanation for
why we share, therefore, has to account for differences among networks. A better
explanation is a form of network-specific trust: with respect to preventing the further
spread of a person’s HIV status, individuals living with HIV can better predict the
future behavior of others also living with HIV (even if they know very little else
about them) than others with whom they may be close for different reasons. This
unstated implication of Shelley’s research suggests that powerful norms of confidentiality and behavior that limit information flow can develop within different social

K. Rempel, John G. Holmes & Mark P. Zanna, Trust in Close Relationships, 49 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PYCHOL. 95, 96 (1985); see also Doney et al., supra note 157, at 605
(“[T]he greater the variety of shared experiences, the greater the generated knowledge base
and the more a target’s behavior becomes predictable . . . .”); David Good, Individuals,
Interpersonal Relations, and Trust, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE
RELATIONS 31, 32 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988); Michael W. Macy & John Skvoretz, The
Evolution of Trust and Cooperation Between Strangers: A Computational Model, 63 AM. SOC.
REV. 638, 648, 655–56 (1998).
161. See, e.g., LAUREL SPRAGUE, THE SERO PROJECT, LEGAL VULNERABILITIES RELATED
TO HIV (2013), http://seroproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Young-people-of-color
-and-criminalization_Sero-results-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4UX-U3HD].
162. Shelley et al., supra note 160, at 204.
163. Id.
164. Id. (parenthetical in original).
165. James Grimmelmann has noted that online social networks allow social interaction to
occur in public, for everyone to see, which fosters norms of reciprocity that encourage individuals to share. See James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1156
(2009) (Social network “sites also piggyback on the deeply wired human impulse to reciprocate. People reciprocate because it helps them solve collective-action problems, because participation in a gift culture demands that gifts be returned or passed along, because it’s disrespectful to spurn social advances, because there’s a natural psychological instinct to mirror
what one’s conversational partner is doing, and because we learn how to conduct ourselves by
imitating others. Facebook’s design encourages reciprocal behavior by making the gestureand-return cycle visible and salient.”).
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networks depending on structure, the nature of the information, and indicia of trust
among members.
3. Takeaways
If we combine the lessons of privacy-as-trust with social network theory, one
overarching conclusion emerges: information disclosed in networks characterized by
trust is not truly public because that information was shared with the legitimate expectation that information recipients would be discrete. Relying upon expectations
of network members’ continued adherence to accepted social norms, individuals
share sensitive information with their network. If it is a network of almost exclusively
strong ties, as many informal social networks are, the information is likely to be kept
confidential. The presence of weak ties increases the likelihood of information diffusion outside the network. And what constitutes a strong or a weak tie may vary
with the information at issue, as will the ease of diffusion: complicated information
generally does not travel through weak ties, but what is simple to one audience may
be complex to another. The greater the audience’s applicable skill level relative to
the information, the more likely it falls on the simpler end of the information
spectrum.
We can apply these lessons to developing a model for analyzing public use cases.
First, the test for public use must be a totality of the circumstances test, as correctly
stated in Bernhardt. This kind of flexible standard is the only way to assess a social
context on a case-by-case basis. Second, the test should focus on (1) the information
disclosed, (2) the network into which inventions are disclosed, looking for weak ties
likely to spread the information and strong ties that do not, and assessing relative
complexity of the information, and (3) the relationship between the parties, looking
for indicia of trust. Third, some of the questions fact finders should ask include, but
may not be limited to, the following: Did the relationship between the inventor and
her audience show any evidence of implied confidentiality and trust? Was the
demonstration or use of the invention done in such a way so as to reveal to the audience how it worked? Was the invention complex, especially relative to the skill level
of the audience? Did the audience contain anyone not bound by trust? And, did the
audience contain “supernodes” that could bridge networks?
These questions can help fact finders establish the expectations of all parties involved in an alleged public use. Notably, these questions do not prevent a court from
considering other factors, including the presence of confidentiality agreements and
evidence of commercial motive for the use. The new standard merely ensures that
neither formal agreements nor commercial intent is elevated to determinative status
and that the locus of analysis shifts from the individual to the social context of
disclosure.
B. Advantages to the Approach: Social Networks and Intellectual Property
Applying privacy-as-trust to public use questions fills the gap left by the current
privacy-as-control approach: it is egalitarian, flexible, practical, and retains fidelity
to the policy objectives of patent law. Nor is it a radical proposal: the respect for
social network theory embedded in privacy-as-trust already cuts across all
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intellectual property regimes. This Article’s flexible, network-oriented approach to
public use will, therefore, fit neatly within our intellectual property legal traditions.
Privacy-as-trust will end the current system’s uneven and unfair application. As
discussed above, the current application of public use law privileges corporate inventors over solo entrepreneurs166 in two ways: respecting industry norms of confidentiality while ignoring the more informal social norms of friends,167 and elevating
the importance of formal confidentiality agreements to near determinative status. 168
The first tendency directly benefits the already entrenched interests of corporate
patentees; the second tendency indirectly enhances their position because only
wealthy inventors have the leverage to insist on nondisclosure agreements and the
money to pay lawyers to write them. These discriminatory applications are an
outgrowth of employing a privacy-as-control standard: it lends itself to bright-line
rules regarding disclosure and ignores the social context in which an inventor decides
to demonstrate her invention. 169
Privacy-as-trust gives judges the tools to reverse these tendencies. It does not discriminate between social networks; indeed, the proposal is built around the notion
that different social networks can create equally powerful norms of confidentiality
and low likelihoods of information diffusion beyond the network. And by shifting
the public use analysis from the inventor’s actions to the social context of disclosure,
it ensures that myriad factors beyond signed confidentiality agreements will be in
play. In turn, inventors and entrepreneurs traditionally underrepresented in the corporate world will be given a fair shot.
It also remains true to the goals of patent law, in general, and the public use bar,
in particular. As expressed by the Federal Circuit outlined in Tone Bros. v. Sysco
Corp.,170 those goals are
(1) discouraging the removal, from the public domain, of inventions that
the public reasonably has come to believe are freely available; (2) favoring the prompt and widespread disclosure of inventions; (3) allowing the
inventor a reasonable amount of time following sales activity to determine the potential economic value of a patent; and (4) prohibiting the
inventor from commercially exploiting the invention for a period greater
than the statutorily prescribed time. 171
Inventions disclosed to close friends or colleagues whom we trust cannot truly be
said to be “freely available” in any sense. It is no different than trusting thousands of
employees or several corporate partners not to talk about a new device. Prompt disclosure and patenting is still incentivized by the America Invents Act’s switch from
a first-to-invent rule, which could delay application as long the inventor had evidence
of when she first created her device, to a first-to-file rule. And there is less likely to
be evidence of commercial exploitation or sales activity in situations of disclosures

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part I.B.2.
See supra Part I.B.1.
See supra Part I.C.
28 F.3d 1192 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1198.
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to social friends and other trusted social networks. Indeed, looking to relationships
of trust may advance the goals of the patent system: it would encourage more experimentation among corporate inventors and lone entrepreneurs alike. As the Supreme
Court said in 1877, it does not frustrate the public interest when delays in patenting
are “occasioned by a bona fide effort to bring [the] invention to perfection, or to
ascertain whether it will answer the purpose intended.”172 The patent monopoly is,
after all, only temporary, “and it is the interest of the public, as well as [the inventor’s], that the invention should be perfect and properly tested, before a patent is
granted for it.”173 A respect for relationships of trust among inventors and their
friends and colleagues would not only help realize this goal, but it would also challenge the results in cases like Beachcombers, Lough, and MIT.
Beyond these policy benefits, the network-oriented approach of privacy-as-trust
occupies an underappreciated yet salient position across intellectual property law,
making it even more reasonable to apply it to public use cases. Social network theory
permeates all branches of intellectual property. In particular, the requirements for
obtaining copyright, patent, trademark, and trade secret protection all incorporate the
principles of social network theory.
Copyright’s originality threshold,174 for example, which requires a bare modicum
of creativity to obtain a copyright, 175 is defined relative to the industry norms in
which the creator belongs. In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services
Co.,176 for example, the seminal Supreme Court case on copyright originality, a runof-the-mill phonebook was not copyrightable because it was designed, arranged, and
presented in an ordinary manner. But “ordinary” was defined relative to the closed
network of other phone books. Rural’s local phone book was “typical,” 177 unlike
Feist’s, which covered a wider area and included additional data. 178 In the end, the
reason why Rural’s local phonebook was not copyrightable was because it was just
like every other phonebook: “Rural’s white pages are entirely typical. . . . The end
product is a garden-variety white pages directory, devoid of even the slightest trace
of creativity.”179 Typicality is, by definition, entirely contextual and based on the
customs and norms of a particular field, that is, something is typical compared to
something else. It is typical for phone books to be alphabetical. It is not typical for,
say, epic poems to be alphabetical listings of words.180

172. Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 137 (1877) (italics omitted).
173. Id.
174. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title,
in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”).
175. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servs. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358 (1991) (“Originality
requires only that the author make the selection or arrangement independently (i. e., without
copying that selection or arrangement from another work), and that it display some minimal
level of creativity.” (italics in original)).
176. Id. at 340.
177. Id. at 342 (“Rural publishes a typical telephone directory . . . .”).
178. Id. at 342–43 (“Unlike a typical directory, which covers only a particular calling area,
Feist’s area-wide directories cover a much larger geographical range . . . .”).
179. Id. at 362 (emphasis added).
180. This precise example was the topic of a discussion, started by my colleague Jake
Sherkow and based on a question from a student in his Intellectual Property class, on the
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Like copyright’s originality threshold, patent law’s substantive requirements of
patentability take a network-oriented approach. Inventions that are obvious to a “person having ordinary skill in the art,” or PHOSITA,181 are unpatentable.182 Patent applications that cannot teach the PHOSITA how to make or use the invention are also
invalid.183
Differences among social networks are also embedded in trademark law. The
Lanham Act protects marks relative to particular goods in commerce: Bass
Brewery’s trademark on the word “Bass,” for example, protects its use of “Bass” for
beer. It does not give the company ownership over the word “bass” in all contexts. 184
Among the several factors courts use to assess consumer confusion and, thus,
trademark infringement under the Lanham Act,185 three take a network-specific approach: the more related the products and the more overlap in marketing channels,
the greater the likelihood of a confusion finding, presuming that products that target
different networks are less likely to be confused with each other. Courts also assess
the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers, implicitly recognizing that
different consumers behave differently. Consumer confusion, therefore, is an information flow problem, but one that reflects how information diffuses from one network to another.186
Trade secret law goes even further than recognizing that social networks exist. In
fact, without ever using the language of social network theory and trust, trade secrecy
employs the network-oriented, trust-based model described above in three ways.
First, a trade secret is defined relative to a given network. Although the rule is that
information “generally known or readily ascertainable” to the public cannot constitute a trade secret, the “public,” in this case, refers to a given industry. 187 The rule

IPProf’s Listserv on September 29, 2014.
181. See, e.g., John O. Tresansky, PHOSITA - The Ubiquitous and Enigmatic Person in
Patent Law, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 37, 37 (1991).
182. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). This is the requirement of nonobviousness.
183. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). This is the enablement requirement.
184. In the text of the Lanham Act, the phrase “in connection with the applicant’s goods in
commerce,” or variation thereof, is used as a dependent clause modifying the scope of the
mark forty-nine times. Lanham Act, Pub. L. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946).
185. There are eight such factors: “similarity of the conflicting designations; relatedness or
proximity of the two companies’ products or services; strength of [the senior] mark; marketing
channels used; degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers in selecting goods; [alleged
infringer’s] intent in selecting its mark; evidence of actual confusion; and likelihood of expansion in product lines.” Brookfield Comm’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,
1053–54 (9th Cir. 1999); see also, e.g., AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49
(9th Cir. 1979). But, as the Ninth Circuit stated in Brookfield, some factors, particularly the
first three, are “more important than others.” Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1054.
186. Jonathan Zittrain has argued that the “problem” of privacy is the same as the “problem” of intellectual property: dissemination of information and the loss of personal control.
Zittrain, supra note 40. I argue that Professor Zittrain is correct, to a point: the problem is not
just information dissemination, but dissemination to a different network.
187. Zoecon Indus. v. Am. Stockman Tag Co., 713 F.2d 1174, 1179 (5th Cir. 1983) (“[T]o
qualify as a trade secret the information cannot be generally known by others in the same
business . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also Mangren Research & Dev. Corp. v. Nat’l Chem.
Co., 87 F.3d 937, 942 (7th Cir. 1996).
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makes sense as a matter of economics and competition, but it also reflects the social
science of information diffusion. An oil company executive might come across the
proprietary recipe of a donut company,188 but unless there are weak ties ready to
disseminate the recipe beyond the oil industry and, somehow, to the confections business, the information is unlikely to get to those who could use it. 189
A second lesson of social network theory—that weak ties between networks are
ill equipped to disseminate complex or aggregated information190—is also reflected
in the law of trade secrets. As the Fifth Circuit stated in Metallurgical Industries, Inc.
v. Fourtek, Inc.,191 a seminal and oft-cited trade secrets case, the aggregation of
pieces of information, “each of which, by itself, is in the public domain,” can be a
trade secret because knowledge and aggregation of those bits of data could provide
a competitive advantage.192 Again, the economic rationale makes sense. But implicit
in this aggregation rule is the assumption that industry competitors are not adept at
piecing together bits of distant data points or, to use the language of social network
theory, that complex and aggregated information does not diffuse through networks
easily and is unlikely to be gathered up, analyzed, and put to use through weak ties.
Otherwise, the aggregate information could not be considered a secret in any sense.
Third, when it comes to the prior disclosure of confidential business information,
a problem similar to prepatenting use, trade secret law takes a network- and
relationship-oriented approach, unconsciously implementing some of the lessons of
social network theory and trust. As Sharon Sandeen showed in her cross-disciplinary
study of privacy and trade secrecy,193 trade secret law embraces the doctrine of “relative secrecy.”194 This is the notion that legal protection for trade secrets can be retained even when others know the secret. The test for determining when such protection exists “is contextual and depends on a number of factors, not the least of which
is the relationship . . . between the trade secret owner and the person(s) to whom the
information is disclosed.”195 Trade secrecy, then, shifts the analysis to the context of
disclosure, finding duties of confidentiality implied by the norms of those contexts.

188. The recipe for Krispy Kreme donuts is a famous trade secret.
189. For a discussion of Mark Granovetter’s theory on the “strength of weak ties” and the
role they play in information diffusion, see supra notes 128–48 and accompanying text.
190. See supra text accompanying note 143.
191. 790 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1986).
192. Id. at 1202 (quoting Water Servs., Inc. v. Tesco Chems., Inc., 410 F.2d 163, 173 (5th
Cir. 1969)); see also, e.g., Penalty Kick Mgmt. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., 318 F.3d 1284, 1291
(11th Cir. 2003); Catalyst & Chem. Servs., Inc. v. Glob. Ground Support, 350 F. Supp. 2d 1,
9 (D.D.C. 2004) (“Defendants have submitted exhibits showing that each parameter individually was within industry knowledge before defendants’ alleged disclosure. Plaintiffs, however,
do not allege only that each parameter individually is a trade secret; rather, they also argue
that all four elements taken together in precise combination constitute a legally protected interest under the Trade Secrets Act. The record does not show that all four parameters were
disclosed together, in a specific combination, to the industry.” (citations omitted)).
193. Sharon K. Sandeen, Relative Privacy: What Privacy Advocates Can Learn from Trade
Secret Law, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 667.
194. Id. at 696. This is also the topic of Professor Strahilevitz’s article, A Social Networks
Theory of Privacy. Strahilevitz, supra note 43.
195. Sandeen, supra note 193, at 697 (emphasis omitted); see also John C. Stedman, Trade
Secrets, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 4, 6 (1962) (quoted in Sandeen, supra note 193, at 697).
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Professor Sandeen gathered and analyzed the case law and found that a diverse array
of relationships has given rise to implied confidentiality: employer and employee,
purchaser and supplier, licensor and licensee, and between partners in joint ventures,
among others.196 Trade secret cases also appreciate the role of norms created by these
relationships rather than just the formalities themselves. As one court stated: “To
give publicity, wantonly, to confidential correspondence, meets with the prompt rebuke and merited condemnation of every one not lost to all honorable feeling. It is a
death-blow to the best interests of civilized society itself . . . .”197 Lofty rhetoric aside,
trade secret law appreciates norms of trust and confidentiality implied by certain social contexts.
What is missing from trade secrecy’s approach to the problem of limited disclosures, and why public use law cannot simply learn the lessons of “relative secrecy”
and move on, is a model for solving the public use’s discrimination problem. Relative
secrecy cases often involve corporate parties and, as Professor Sandeen has shown,
the relationships that courts have so far recognized as giving rise to implied duties of
confidentiality are business relationships. That confidentiality agreements are not required, in doctrine and in practice, is a step forward. But trade secrecy does not get
us any further toward respecting the powerful confidentiality norms of networks of
friends, solo entrepreneurs, part-time inventors, and hobbyists. A social networkbased doctrine of trust does just that.
III. REORIENTING PUBLIC USE LAW
Armed with the lessons of social networks and privacy-as-trust, we can return to
the public use cases discussed above and summarized in Table I. Recall that sometimes, not having a confidentiality agreement in place has little-to-no effect on a public use analysis: those cases tend to involve Cluster A (corporate) inventors, who,
based on the twenty-five cases discussed above, usually win their public use cases.
Other times, confidentiality agreements are essential, leading many Cluster B (solo
entrepreneur) inventors to lose their public use cases. 198 Even where Cluster A inventors lose, courts’ tendencies to elevate formal secrecy agreements to near determinative status is a boon: only inventors with the power and money of a large corporation have the leverage to put nondisclosure commitments in writing and force
their business partners to sign them.199 And where confidentiality agreements are
missing, courts tend to be willing to fill the gap with the customs and norms of industry, but rarely do so with the more informal, yet no less powerful norms of solo
inventors, hobbyists, and part-time innovators.200 In short, the application of the public use bar is either haphazard, at best, or discriminatory, at worst, with no clear tools
in the current doctrine to resolve the problem. The dominant theory of adjudication—
what privacy scholars would call privacy-as-control—lends itself to the harsh, bright
line, and uneven application of the law. This raises the question of how to reform
public use law to create more certainty, fairness, and justice.

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Sandeen, supra note 193, at 698–99.
Roberts v. McKee, 29 Ga. 161, 163 (1859), quoted in Sandeen, supra note 193, at 701.
See supra notes 57–76 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 77–85 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 87–102 and accompanying text.
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Social network theory and privacy-as-trust offer a model for adjudicating public
use cases. Using a totality of the circumstances test that focuses on the audience for
a disclosure, the information’s complexity relative to that audience, and the relationship between the inventor and the audience, the standard will comport with what we
know about how and why individuals share information with others. In this Part, I
revisit some of the leading public use cases discussed above and show how some
would turn out the same, others would end differently, and the fate of others requires
more information. Luckily, a network- and trust-oriented approach also lays out clear
pathways for the admission of evidence, allowing appellate judges to remand cases
with specific instructions for fact finding. I then respond to possible objections to
applying privacy-as-trust to public use.
A. Looking at the Cases Anew
A case like Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp.,201 a Cluster A case, would come to the
same result. The analysis would vary only slightly. In Xerox, a company employee
invented a method that improved computer handwriting recognition. 202 Concluding
that the inventor’s submission of a videotape of himself demonstrating the invention
to conference organizers as part of an application to present did not invalidate his
patent, the court explained that the videotape was not a public use: no one, other than
the inventor, had actually used anything.203 That can hardly be the rule in public use
cases; cases like Baxter and Eolas Technologies v. Microsoft Corp. both found invalidating public uses after mere demonstration by the inventor. 204 But the court did
rely on the norms, customs, and practices of the context of the disclosure. Although
the inventor in Xerox did not include a secrecy agreement along with his submission,
the court recognized that conference organizers keep submissions confidential as a
matter of “professional courtesy and practice” and that they were under “a professional ethical obligation” to maintain secrecy. 205
This holding makes sense under a social network and trust model, as well. Given
the relationship between the inventor and his audience, norms of trust can be implied:
academic conference organizers generally do not reveal the details of submissions
made to them. And even if the submission was sent to the two organizers who shared
it with a selection committee, that audience was a close-knit closed network of strong
ties. As such, the information was unlikely to jump from one small network to another wider network.
Under a social network and trust framework, Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS,
Inc.206 would come to the same result, but for very different reasons. Indeed, the
analysis of this case highlights the chasm between the current doctrine and

201. 26 F. Supp. 2d 492 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
202. Id. at 493.
203. Id. at 495–96.
204. See Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (involving demonstration to Sun Microsystems employees); Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Cobe Labs., Inc.,
88 F.3d 1054, 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (involving inventor who showed others how the
centrifuge worked).
205. Xerox, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 496.
206. 793 F.2d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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application and shows how a social network approach honors the letter and spirit of
the law.
Moleculon seems to stand for the proposition that, as with trade secrets’ doctrine
of “relative secrecy,”207 the relationship between the inventor and her audience matters for public use. A close look at the Federal Circuit’s reasoning shows that, in fact,
the likelihood of confidentiality of close-knit networks was ignored. In Moleculon,
an organic chemistry graduate student and puzzle enthusiast invented what we would
now recognize as a device similar to a Rubik’s Cube.208 He developed various paper
models of the device and showed them to close friends, two roommates, and a colleague in the chemistry department. Once employed at Moleculon, the inventor left
a wooden version on his desk, where his employer saw it and took an interest in it.
After the inventor demonstrated how it worked, they jointly decided that Moleculon
would try to market the device, at which point they sent a prototype to Parker
Brothers and many other toy manufacturers.209 No one signed confidentiality agreements. Nor, as far as we know, was there any overt discussion of secrecy. The maker
of the Rubik’s Cube, which Moleculon alleged infringed the patent on its device,
challenged the patent’s validity for public use: the inventor’s decision to show the
device to his friends, roommates, colleagues, and boss, they argued, more than met
public use’s publicity requirement.
The Federal Circuit disagreed, but in so doing, although it professed to focus on
the relationships between the parties involved in the disclosures, it really did no such
thing. Rather, the court’s analysis looked at the volitional acts of the inventor, in line
with the strict limits of privacy-as-control. The court suggested that “the personal
relationships and other surrounding circumstances” gave rise to a “legitimate expectation of privacy and of confidentiality” at all times.210 But, upon closer examination
of the decision, it appears that the relationships did not matter. What mattered was
that the inventor never physically gave his invention to anyone else and never
evinced a commercial motive for his demonstrations. That he at all times retained
physical possession was what distinguished this case from Egbert v. Lippmann,211
the 1881 Supreme Court case where the Court said that an inventor made a public
use of a corset when he gave it to his girlfriend to wear under her clothes. It could
not have been the relationships between inventor and audience that distinguished
Egbert; if anything, the implied confidentiality among lovers is stronger than between roommates and colleagues. The only thing that distinguishes Egbert is that, in
Egbert, the inventor physically handed over the corset; in Moleculon, he kept it in
his hands during the demonstration. The Federal Circuit also relied on the inventor’s
lack of commercial intent in demonstrating his puzzle, reinforcing its focus on
whether the inventor gave up control of the device. 212
Looking at Moleculon through the lens of privacy-as-trust would retain the result
(a finding of nonpublic use), but employ an analysis far more open and transparent.
Close friends and roommates, to whom the puzzle inventor demonstrated his device,

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

See supra text accompanying notes 193–97.
Moleculon, 793 F.2d at 1263.
Id.
Id. at 1265.
104 U.S. 333 (1881).
Moleculon, 793 F.2d at 1266–67.
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represent the kind of close-knit strong ties that recycle information within a network.
They also have long histories of experience with each other, contributing to implied
norms of confidentiality upon which individuals should be able to rely. Indeed, evidence was admitted at trial that “[a]ll who may have seen the model were intimate
friends of [the inventor] and he would have been ‘astonished if any of them had felt
free to do something with . . . the idea . . . .’”213 What’s more, these friends,
roommates, and colleagues, some of whom were fellow chemists, were not engineers
or puzzle experts: merely showing them a series of cubes with rotating blocks would
not have allowed them to reverse engineer the device. Therefore, given the audience’s relationship to the subject matter of the invention, the information disclosed
was complex and of the type unlikely to be easily transmitted outside the network
via weak ties. Social network and trust theory suggest that the inventor’s demonstrations were not public.
And JumpSport, Inc. v. Jumpking, Inc. would, like the court found, result in a
finding of public use under privacy-as-trust. The invention—protective netting
around a trampoline214—is simple to understand and easy to transmit by the weak
ties (neighbors) that used it in the inventor’s backyard. Although norms of trust can
indeed develop among acquaintances, additional evidence would likely show little
basis for trust. This suggests that the invention could be disseminated to other networks beyond just the inventor’s neighbors.
The real power of privacy-as-trust, though, is evident from the cases where results
and reasoning would change, best illustrated by a Cluster B case, Beachcombers International, Inc. v. WildeWood Creative Products, Inc.,215 and a Cluster A case,
Honeywell International Inc. v. Universal Avionics Systems Corp.216 In Beachcombers, the Federal Circuit found that demonstration of a new kaleidoscope at the designer’s home constituted invalidating public use. 217 The court was not clear about
its reasoning; the lack of any analysis may suggest that the court was simply relying
on the lack of any confidentiality agreement.218 At a minimum, it is clear that the
court ignored the social context of disclosure. The invite-only party was at the designer’s private home and gathered twenty to thirty of her friends for the express
purpose of soliciting feedback.219 Despite the lack of any formal secrecy agreement,
social network and trust theory would conclude that what happened at the cocktail
party was not public use. The audience members were her friends, many of whom
likely fall into the strong-tie category and engender norms of confidentiality; additional evidence could be admitted to describe the audience in more detail. In any
event, that those in attendance were the designer’s social friends suggests that the
technology of the kaleidoscope was relatively complex to them, making it the type
of information that does not travel well through weak ties. Therefore, even if the
invitees included some acquaintances or weak ties, the details of the invention would

213. Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 1420, 1425 (D. Del. 1984), aff’d
in part, vacated in part, 793 F.2d 1261 (ellipses in original) (quoting trial transcript at 897).
214. JumpSport, Inc. v. Jumpking, Inc., 191 Fed. App’x. 926, 929 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
215. 31 F.3d 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
216. 448 F.3d 982 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
217. Beachcombers, 31 F.3d at 1160.
218. See id.
219. Id.
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be unlikely to travel well from network to network. Nor should we ignore the fact
that the alleged public use took place at the designer’s home, a paradigmatic private
context,220 which not only makes further information diffusion even less likely, but
also contributes to the emergence of reliable norms of confidentiality.
The result in Honeywell would also change. That case involved Honeywell’s terrain warning system,221 which helped prevent pilots from flying into mountains and
which was demonstrated to potential customers and a reporter more than one year
before patenting.222 The Federal Circuit found no public use because all demonstrations could be considered experimental. That rationale rings hollow: the demonstrations were for customers—more than 150 of them223—who, the court admitted,
would be purchasing the technology in the future.224 It was more important to the
court that Honeywell personnel conducted the demonstrations and “maintained control over them,”225 even though it is hard to imagine who else would be conducting
the test runs. To make these demonstrations seem relatively private, the district court
emphasized that there was no indication that the general public ever became aware
of the technology.226 That a reporter was on board was irrelevant.
Social network and trust theory would conclude, from the totality of the circumstances, that Honeywell engaged in public use. The audience for its disclosure included members of the aviation industry who were likely going to purchase the system and a former pilot and aviation reporter who subsequently wrote an article about
the technology. These are precisely the kind of weak ties that could both understand
the technology and disseminate it; indeed, the writer’s job is to disseminate the information. There is also no indication, unlike, say, in Bernhardt,227 that the norms
and customs of the aviation industry ensure that all parties share the burden of keeping information confidential. Additional evidence about industry norms and practice
could be admitted to buttress or challenge that conclusion.
There are undoubtedly some closer calls, but additional evidence could help us
apply the social network and trust model. In Lough, for example, where a boat repairman installed his new device on his friends’ boats,228 we would want to know
more about these friends, their history with the inventor, and their proficiency with
boat hardware and technology. We would also want to know whether others at the
marina saw the invention and had enough time, know-how, and opportunity to copy
it. In National Research Development Corp., where the inventor’s academic adviser
disclosed his student’s invention to an acquaintance at an academic conference, 229

220. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“[T]he interior of homes [is]
the prototypical and hence most commonly litigated area of protected privacy . . . .”).
221. Honeywell, 488 F.3d at 987.
222. Id. at 998.
223. Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 343 F. Supp. 2d 272, 307–08
(D. Del. 2004), aff’d, 488 F.3d 982.
224. Id. at 308.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Bernhardt, L.L.C. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 386 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2004); see also supra text accompanying notes 87–91.
228. 86 F.3d 1113, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
229. No. 93-1421, 1994 WL 18963 at *3 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 26, 1994).
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applying social network and trust theory would require additional evidence about the
relationship between the parties. But this type of evidence is easily admitted, and the
detour into social science is well worth the added fairness benefits.
In the end, social network and trust theory offer a fair and administrable approach
to public use cases. The proposal resembles trade secrecy’s relative secrecy doctrine,
brings intellectual property’s respect for social networks to a forgotten corner of
patent law, and, in so doing, treats corporate and solo inventors equally and gives
everyone a chance to contribute to the innovation economy. In some situations, cases
would have come to different results under privacy-as-trust. But for most cases, the
doctrine provides a robust intellectual foundation for reasoning through public use
questions and helps ensure honest application of what was always meant to be a
flexible standard for patent validity.
B. Responses to Potential Objections
Some might object to the structure or mode of analysis of privacy-as-trust as too
indeterminate and inappropriate for patent law. Others might focus on the results,
suggesting that the proposal would encourage risky business behavior and cut off
more knowledge from the public domain, thus running counter to the goals of patent
law. I respond to these objections in turn.
A totality of the circumstances test, one might argue, is too flexible and too indeterminate, providing too much discretion, too few guidelines, and no way to prevent
a judge from imposing his personal preferences on a given case. This is a common
refrain in diverse areas of law, 230 but it rings hollow in this case. Totality of the circumstances tests, in general, allow fair and individual determinations of fact-specific
cases. They are in use across intellectual property regimes. 231 And even under the
current standard, public use cases are supposed to be highly fact specific, depending
on the inventor’s actions, the details of the disclosure, and whether she had the foresight and leverage to mandate nondisclosure. What’s more, the very deficiencies
identified in this Article—discriminatory application of public use law to privilege
corporate inventors over solo entrepreneurs—stem not from a boundless totality of
the circumstances test, but a misapplication of the law through a bright-line

230. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.3, at
143–45 (2d ed. 1992) (probable cause determinations); Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile
Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141, 173–77 (1984)
(juvenile criminal justice); Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process:
The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1845 (1992)
(voting rights); B.J. Huey, Note, Undue Hardship or Undue Burden: Has the Time Finally
Arrived for Congress To Discharge Section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code?, 34 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 89, 108 (2002) (tax); see also Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 103 F.3d 1517, 1519 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (Lourie, J., concurring) (“With respect to . . . public use . . . , courts have been
accustomed to referring to their determinations as involving ‘the totality of the circumstances,’
a phrase that some have objected to as being indefinite.”); Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track &
Court Constr., 98 F.3d 1318, 1323 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating, in the on-sale bar context, that
the totality of the circumstances test is often criticized as being unnecessarily vague).
231. See, e.g., Chance v. Pac-Tel Teletrac Inc., 242 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying a
totality of the circumstances test for determining priority in trademark law).
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privacy-as-control standard.232 Although bright-line rules are undoubtedly more
definite, this Article’s social network and trust approach comes with clear guidelines
that limit the analysis to only relevant factors: the social context of disclosure, the
information disclosed, and the relationships between the audience and the inventor
and the audience and the information.233
A second structural objection to this Article’s social network and trust proposal is
that it imports a doctrine from unrelated areas of law and social science that address
problems and policies distinct from patent law. I disagree. Not only did Sam Warren
and Louis Brandeis refer to the doctrinal and theoretical relationships between intellectual property and privacy law more than 125 years ago, 234 distinguished scholars
in both fields have been learning lessons from each other ever since.235 Indeed, paraphrasing Jonathan Zittrain’s powerful argument, the “problem” of privacy and intellectual property is the same: information flow.236 In privacy, individuals seek to protect the dissemination of personal data; many privacy questions concern the wrongful
disclosure of intimate information. The public use bar addresses a similar matter
—namely, the diffusion of information about an invention via first-person disclosure.
To answer these questions, both fields seek a way to draw the boundary between
public and private after an initial, limited disclosure. Considering similar approaches,
therefore, makes sense.
The final two objections concern the practical implications of employing a social
network and trust approach to public use. Some might argue that by recognizing the
norms of confidentiality of informal relationships between friends and intimates, this
Article’s proposal would result in more findings of nonpublic use. But allowing more
inventors to use their devices without the voluminous disclosures required in a patent
application would run counter to the central goal of patent law, which is the

232. See supra text accompanying notes 49–54.
233. Nor has the Federal Circuit disclaimed a totality of the circumstances test in public
use cases. Until the Supreme Court decided Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55
(1998), the federal courts had been using a totality of the circumstances test to adjudicate both
the public use and on-sale bars. Pfaff, an on-sale bar case, switched the standard to a “ready
for patenting” test, but since the Court had no occasion to address public use, the totality of
the circumstances remained good law for the public use bar. Id. at 67. But the Federal Circuit’s
decision in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004),
vacated en banc, 403 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005), aff’d on other grounds, 403 F.3d 1331 (Fed.
Cir. 2005), opted to apply the Supreme Court’s on-sale rule to public use. Id. at 1316. Still
later, the Federal Circuit appeared to return to a totality of the circumstances test in Bernhardt,
L.L.C. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 386 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and in Dey, L.P.
v. Sunovion Pharmaceuticals., Inc., 715 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2013). In Invitrogen Corp.
v. Biocrest Manufacturing, L.P., 424 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the Federal Circuit offered a
middle ground that ultimately retained the totality of the circumstances test for determining
public use. The court stated that the “proper test” for public use is “whether the purported use:
(1) was accessible to the public; or (2) was commercially exploited.” That said, determining
“publicness” under prong (1) required falling back on the totality of the circumstances test
described above. Id. at 1380.
234. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
198–205 (1890).
235. See, e.g., Zittrain, supra note 40.
236. See id. at 1203.
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disclosure of knowledge to the public.237 This argument misreads the data and misses
the point of privacy-as-trust. As discussed above, some public and nonpublic use
cases would come to same results under a social network and trust approach. The
proposal is merely a mode of analysis that also addresses inequality in the application
of current public use law. If it does result in more solo entrepreneurs being allowed
to retain their patents, so be it: the PTO has already recognized the need to improve
access by part-time inventors and hobbyists,238 and the progress of science and technology in society, the salient and overarching purpose of the patent system,239 could
only benefit.
Some may argue, too, that even if secrecy commitments are not always possible,
codifying norms of confidentiality as adequate replacements encourages risky behavior. The law, the argument continues, should incentivize corporate and solo entrepreneurs alike to take every necessary precaution to secure their inventions, and
downplaying confidentiality agreements does the opposite. I resist the temptation to
use a discriminatory weapon as a paternalistic tool, especially one that has a disparate
impact on entrepreneurs. Focusing on the context of disclosure encourages risky behavior no more than privacy law does when it allows individuals to rely on their
legitimate expectations of privacy. And the elevation of confidentiality agreements
to near determinative status is less a tool of social policy than a giveaway to corporate
entities that have the leverage to employ them. What’s more, as evidenced by its Pro
Se Assistance Program240 and Law School Clinic Program,241 the PTO already believes that solo entrepreneurs deserve a chance to access the innovation economy
without having to meet some of the same demands as corporate inventors. A social
network and trust model for public use, therefore, does not so much encourage bad
behavior as implement an egalitarian approach to patentability.
CONCLUSION
Current public use law tends to privilege corporate inventors over solo entrepreneurs. It does so by employing a privacy-as-control model for determining when a
prepatenting disclosure or use was sufficiently public to invalidate a patent, elevating
confidentiality agreements to near determinative status and respecting the confidentiality norms of industry while ignoring the different, yet equally as powerful norms
of individuals. This Article proposes a new way of thinking through and adjudicating

237. Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Inter-Chem. Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330–31 (1945) (“The primary purpose of our patent system is not reward of the individual but the advancement of the
arts and sciences. Its inducement is directed to disclosure of advances in knowledge which
will be beneficial to society; it is not a certificate of merit, but an incentive to disclosure.”
(footnote omitted)).
238. See PRO SE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE
http://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/using-legal-services/pro-se-assistance-program
[https://perma.cc/R9LD-PGFT].
239. Sinclair, 325 U.S. at 330–31; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
240. PRO SE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, supra note 238.
241. LAW SCHOOL CLINIC CERTIFICATION PROGRAM, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/ip-policy/public-information-about-practitioners
/law-school-clinic-1 [https://perma.cc/RVE6-9KBM].
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public use cases by employing a privacy-as-trust model. This approach recognizes
that disclosure is a contextual, fact-specific social phenomenon that can only be evaluated through the lens of social science, specifically social network theory and trust.
An administrable model that focuses on the social context of disclosure, the relationship between the inventor and her audience, and the relationships between the
audience and the information disclosure is proposed, as well. As applied, privacy-astrust may change results in some cases, but more importantly, it will provide a
coherent, predictable, and fair method for analyzing public use cases.
Research into the role of social network theory and trust, in general, and in intellectual property law, specifically, must continue. With respect to public use, this
Article has not considered questions of institutional competence, or whether judges
or juries are more capable of the social science analysis proposed herein. As for other
questions across the intellectual property spectrum, future scholarship will tease out
the role of social networks and trust in trademark, copyright, and trade secret law.
And the importance of trust in other areas of law must be teased out, a project on
which several scholars are already engaged. Needless to say, this Article is one step
in a larger research journey. But when it comes to public use law, social network and
trust theory offer a practical, egalitarian, and honest way forward.

